Transatlantic Trends 2010 Partners
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Executive Summary 2010

Many foreign policy experts hoped that the election of U.S. President Barack Obama would open a new chapter in transatlantic relations after years of European disagreement with the previous administration — and last year’s Transatlantic Trends provided some evidence of this. The survey showed that the new American president enjoyed significantly higher approval ratings than his predecessor in all countries surveyed — as much as 80 percentage points in some cases. However, there was still concern that these numbers were based on the new president’s relatively short time in office and that the numbers might not hold.

This year’s Transatlantic Trends survey, conducted 18 months after Obama took office, showed that while Obama’s overall approval remained high in the European Union (EU) countries surveyed (78%), there was a slight decline from last year (83%). But while the American president’s overall approval decreased slightly, the desirability of strong U.S. leadership in world affairs stabilized. As with last year’s survey, the majority of EU respondents (55%) found it desirable that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs.

Despite the fact that roughly three-in-four EU respondents approved of the American president’s overall foreign policy, his handling of specific foreign policy issues was less popular. Europeans were especially likely to disapprove of the way the president had handled Afghanistan and Iran — disapproval that reflects a consistent and long-term transatlantic divide on security issues. On the other side of the Atlantic, Obama’s policies toward Afghanistan enjoyed majority support among Americans, and the U.S. public was roughly evenly divided on his handling of Iran.

The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty had significant implications for EU leadership, including the creation of two important positions to promote a more unified European voice at home and abroad: the European Council President and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. However, despite these changes, views on EU leadership did not change significantly. The overwhelming majority of EU respondents (78%) still found it desirable that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs.

After the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the European Union survived the first real test of its common currency. While the benefits of the euro divided public opinion, membership in the EU was seen by majorities as a good thing for their respective countries’ economies. Most importantly, majorities on the continent agreed that the recent economic difficulties should lead to a stronger European Union. A plurality of EU respondents also said that in dealing with the current economic crisis, each country’s national government should have the primary responsibility rather than the European Union.

Afghanistan, Iran, and NATO’s strategic review dominated the transatlantic security agenda this year. Although all surveyed countries had troops stationed in Afghanistan at the time of the fieldwork, public opinion on each side of the Atlantic remained divided over Afghanistan. The United States was the only country in which a very slim majority of respondents felt optimistic about stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. At the same time, only about one-quarter of EU respondents felt the same optimism — down nine points from last year. A plurality of EU respondents said that their country should withdraw all troops, up from last year. The majority of EU respondents thought that their
country should either reduce or withdraw troops, while the United States was the only country in which a majority of the population supported increasing or maintaining troop levels in Afghanistan.

The overwhelming majority of EU and American respondents were concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Turkey was the only country in which a plurality of respondents was concerned only a little or not at all. Despite being similarly troubled, American and EU respondents held different opinions about how best to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Europeans preferred offering economic incentives while a plurality of Americans favored economic sanctions. While initially unpopular, military force gained more public support when respondents were asked to imagine that all nonmilitary options had been exhausted and were given the choice between military action and accepting a nuclear Iran.

Europeans and Americans also had somewhat different expectations when it came to rising world powers. The overwhelming majority of Americans and EU respondents predicted that the United States is likely to exert strong leadership in the future. A large majority of Americans also found it likely that the European Union will exert strong leadership — more Americans thought so than did Europeans themselves. Fewer Europeans than Americans said that China and Russia will exert strong leadership. A solid majority of Americans expected India to exert strong leadership in world affairs, but the majority of EU respondents thought it was unlikely that the world’s most populous democracy will exert strong leadership five years from now.

Europeans and Americans differed not only in their projections of Chinese power, but also in their views on common interests and values. While about half of Americans agreed that the United States has enough common values with China to cooperate on international problems, almost two-thirds of EU respondents thought that China and Europe have such different values that cooperating on international problems is impossible. However, respondents on both sides of the Atlantic were somewhat more likely to say that they had common interests than to say they had common values with China.

This year’s survey revealed that Poland, on a variety of issues, consistently stood apart from other EU countries surveyed. While Polish attitudes toward the American president’s foreign policies and U.S. leadership remained generally more positive than during the Bush administration, Polish Atlanticism still lagged behind that of other countries in the survey. Poles were the least likely in the EU to say that they approved of Obama’s handling of international affairs or of his handling of relations with their own country. At the same time, Poles were less supportive of U.S. leadership than the EU average and the least likely in the EU to say NATO is still essential.

Turkish public opinion has always stood apart from that of the other countries in the survey, but this year’s results are particularly striking and shed light on the direction of Turkey’s recent foreign policy. Turkey seems to be increasingly looking east, as the percentage of Turks who said Turkey should act in closest cooperation with the countries of the Middle East on international matters doubled from last year and those preferring to work with countries of the EU declined. Compared to last year, Turks were less convinced that NATO is essential, less interested in joining the EU, and less likely to say their country shares values with the West.

"Transatlantic Trends" is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion. Polling was conducted by TNS Opinion between June 1 and June 29, 2010, in the United States and 12 European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation. The academic advisory committee for the survey included Pierangelo Isernia, professor of political science, University of Siena (Italy); Philip Everts, emeritus director of the Institute of International Studies, University of Leiden (Netherlands); and Richard Eichenberg, associate professor of political
science, Tufts University (United States). The Transatlantic Trends 2010 key findings report was written by Zsolt Nyiri, Director of Transatlantic Trends. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable contributions from Ben Veater-Fuchs and Michal Baranowski in producing the report.

KEY FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY INCLUDE:

- Nearly four-in-five EU respondents (78%) approved of the way Barack Obama is handling international policies — a modest decline from last year’s approval rate of 83%. The most dramatic decrease in Obama’s approval was in Turkey, a drop from 50% approval in 2009 to 28% in 2010.

- Approval of Obama’s individual policies lagged behind his overall approval. EU respondents were least likely to approve of the way the president had been handling Afghanistan (49%) and Iran (49%).

- A slim majority of the American public (52%) approved of the president’s handling of international policies. A majority of Americans approved of his policies toward Russia (61%), climate change (56%), Afghanistan (54%), and Iran (52%).

- Just like last year 55% of respondents in the European Union found it desirable that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs in 2010. The overwhelming majority of EU (78%) and American (72%) respondents felt EU leadership in world affairs was desirable. With few exceptions, majorities of

1 For all questions, European averages were weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country to maintain consistency with previous years’ reports. For new questions, the results were also weighted so that the sample matches certain population characteristics, including age, gender, and education.

2 The U.S. survey fieldwork was carried out by a new survey organization in 2010. This resulted in some changes in trend data due to different interviewing protocols used by the new survey organization, a phenomenon called “house effect.” Specifically, the results showed a drop in the number of “don’t know” responses. For this reason, some of the questions were asked again from a representative sample of 456 Americans between July 29, 2010 and August 4, 2010. This time, interviewers were retrained to be more in line with previous year’s protocols. For questions Q1b_1, Q11, Q25b, and Q26, the results of the new survey were reported after a careful comparison of the data from the two surveys.

- A majority of EU respondents (63%) agreed that being a member of the European Union has been a good thing for their country’s own economy.

- More than half of EU respondents (57%) felt that economic difficulties in Europe should lead to greater commitment to build a stronger European Union.

- As in previous years, the United States was the only country where a slight majority of respondents (51%) felt optimistic about stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, down five points from 2009. At the same time, only about one-quarter of EU respondents (23%) felt the same optimism, down nine points from last year.

- A majority of EU respondents (64%) thought that their country should either reduce or withdraw troops, while only 41% of U.S. respondents felt the same, though that was still up from 30% in 2009. The United States was the only country in which a majority supported maintaining or increasing troop levels in Afghanistan.

- The overwhelming majority of American (86%) and EU (79%) respondents were somewhat or very concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Only in Turkey (48%) was a plurality of respondents concerned only a little or not at all.

- To prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, a plurality of EU respondents (35%) preferred offering economic incentives, while a plurality of Americans (40%), regardless of political preference, favored economic sanctions. Roughly twice as many Americans (25%) as EU respondents (13%) favored providing support to the opposition of the current government in Tehran.

- Despite growing weary of the war in Afghanistan, majorities or pluralities in all countries surveyed still supported NATO being prepared to act outside of
Europe. Large majorities in the United States (77%) and the EU (62%) said that NATO should be prepared to act outside of Europe to defend members from threats to their security.

- The overwhelming majority of American (90%) and EU respondents (81%) predicted that the United States is likely to exert strong leadership five years from now. A strong majority of American (84%) and EU respondents (75%) also said that the European Union will exert strong leadership. However, considerably more American (91%) than EU (68%) respondents said that China will exert strong leadership.

- Around half of Americans (53%) agreed that the United States has enough common values with China to be able to cooperate on international problems. In stark contrast, almost two-thirds of European respondents (63%) agreed that China and Europe have such different values that cooperating on international problems is impossible.

- Fewer than 20% of U.S. and EU respondents said that China plays a positive role in managing global conflicts, fighting poverty in the world, or fighting climate change.

- The percentage of Turks who said Turkey should act in closest cooperation with the countries of the Middle East on international matters has doubled to 20% from last year, coinciding with a nine-point decline in those who said Turkey should cooperate with EU countries (13%) and those who said Turkey should act alone on international matters (34%).

- Turkish public support for joining the EU continued to decline. In 2004, 73% of the Turkish public said membership would be a good thing, but by this year support had dropped to 38%.

- Only 53% of Poles approved of Obama’s handling of relations with their country — the least of any EU country surveyed and much lower than the EU average of 76%.

- Fewer Poles (58%) than other EU respondents (78%) approved of Obama’s handling of international policies in general.
Section One: The Obama Puzzle — The Whole Is More than the Sum of its Parts

Last year’s Transatlantic Trends survey found a remarkable bounce in the public approval of the American president in Europe. In some West European countries, there was an unprecedented 70 to 80 point increase in the new U.S. president’s approval compared to George W. Bush’s approval in 2008. This Obama-fueled euphoria was accompanied by an increase in the desire for U.S. global leadership. After the first full year of Barack Obama’s presidency, the public is now in a better position to evaluate whether its high expectations were met.

This year, Transatlantic Trends found that Obama continued to be popular, much more popular than George W. Bush had ever been, in the 11 European Union (EU) countries included in the survey (see Chart 1). However, public approval for his individual foreign policies was relatively low compared to his overall popularity.

Nearly four-in-five people in the EU countries polled (78%) approved of the way Barack Obama is handling international policies. The Portuguese (88%), Germans (87%), Italians (84%), and French (82%) were the most likely to approve of his international policies. While Obama still enjoyed very strong support in the European Union, there was also a modest decline from last year’s approval rate of 83%. Notably, Obama’s approval dropped by 10 or more

Chart 1: Approval of the U.S. President

* Uses EU7 for years 2002-2006 and EU11 for years 2007-2010 (please see methodology section)
percentage points in the U.K., the Netherlands, and Spain. It dropped by seven points in Italy, six points in France, and five points in Germany. It remained essentially the same in Poland, Portugal, and Bulgaria, and increased by five points in Slovakia and six in Romania. The gains in the latter two countries are especially noteworthy because the president’s popularity was relatively low in Central and Eastern Europe last year.

Compared to last year, the relatively small minority of EU respondents who disapproved of Obama’s handling of international policies doubled from 8% to 16%. This year, not one EU country surveyed had an Obama disapproval rating in the single digits — a common finding last year. In comparison, the disapproval rate of George W. Bush in 2008 was at 75% in the same 11 countries. While disapproval of Barack Obama’s international policies remains low in 2010, this increase nonetheless warrants close monitoring in the coming years.

The most dramatic decrease in Obama’s approval was in Turkey — a drop from 50% approval in 2009 to 28% in 2010. However, this is still much higher than President Bush’s approval ratings at any time between 2002 and 2008. The decrease in Obama’s popularity in Turkey is in line with other polls, such as Pew’s 2010 Global Attitudes Survey, in predominantly Muslim countries where there is growing disillusionment about the U.S. president.

**POPULAR PRESIDENT, LESS POPULAR POLICIES**

While Obama’s general handling of international policies enjoyed strong support in Europe, approval of his individual policies lagged behind (see Chart 2). This gap indicates that the U.S. president was not able to change deeply rooted transatlantic differences in public opinion about some of the most important security issues. Those living in the EU countries surveyed were especially unlikely to approve of the way the president had been handling Afghanistan (49%) and Iran (49%), the only two cases where fewer than...
half of the EU respondents approved of his policies. The Poles were the least likely to approve of Obama’s handling of Afghanistan (22%) and managing relations with Iran (19%). Only the Turks showed similarly low approval rates on Afghanistan (24%) and Iran (17%). On the other side of the Atlantic, however, Obama’s policies toward Afghanistan enjoyed majority support among Americans (54%), and the U.S. public was roughly divided on Iran, with 52% approving and 48% disapproving of his policies toward that country. With the exception of Germany (40%), majorities approved of Obama’s handling of Afghanistan in the countries with the most troops in Afghanistan: the U.K. (51%), France (57%), and Italy (62%).

The majority of EU respondents supported Obama’s work on easing tensions in the Middle East (59%), fighting climate change (61%), and managing relations with Russia (65%). The high marks on Russia suggest the Obama administration’s “reset” policy toward Russia met the approval of a majority of Europeans. While Obama’s management of U.S.–Russia relations received the lowest approval in Poland, a slim majority (52%) still approved. Majorities in other Central and Eastern European countries also approved of Obama’s policies toward Russia — Slovakia (65%), Bulgaria (63%), and Romania (57%). The majority of Turks (57%), however, disapproved of his handling of issues with Russia.

The U.S. president’s high approval rate on fighting climate change indicates that majorities in the 11 EU countries do not seem to blame him for the lack of progress at the Copenhagen Summit in December last year. The summit, which was generally described as a failure, fell short of expectations on establishing legally binding targets for carbon emissions. His approval ratings on climate change were especially high in Italy (76%) and Portugal (72%) but were lacking in Turkey (29%) and Poland (38%).

The one area where the American president received positive evaluations similar to his overall handling of international policies was on how he managed relations with the respondent’s country. On average, 76% of EU respondents said that Obama was managing relations with their country well. The Italians (91%), Germans (88%), and Portuguese (82%) were the most satisfied, while the Poles (53%) were the least satisfied. A majority of Turks (55%) disapproved of how Obama manages relations with their country, and less than one-in-three (28%) approved.

**PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL IN THE UNITED STATES IS LOWER**

Obama has never been as popular with the public at home as he has been with Europeans. In 2010, a slim majority of the American public (52%) approved of the president’s handling of international policies. Unlike in Europe, however, Americans have similar or higher approval rates for many of his specific policies. The majority of Americans approved of his policies toward Russia (61%), climate change (56%), Afghanistan (54%), and Iran (52%). Only his managing of tensions in the Middle East dipped below a majority (48%).

Not surprisingly, presidential approval is strongly related to partisan affiliation (see Chart 3). Seventy-five percent of Democrats but only 14% of Republicans approved of Obama’s handling of international policies. In contrast, there was more partisan parity with regard to some of the specific policy areas: 69% of Democrats and 47% of Republicans approved of how the president handles Afghanistan. Democrats often rated Obama’s specific policies higher or equal to his general handling of international affairs. Democratic approval of the president was high with regard to Russia (86%), climate change (80%), Iran (80%), and the Middle East (76%).

Partisan division in the United States was especially profound with regard to the management of the U.S. economy. Republicans rated the president at a staggeringly low 6% while 87% of the Democrats and 48% of independents approved of his approach.

**VIEWS ON U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP STABILIZE**

There is little doubt that the popularity of the American president has increased the desirability of U.S. leadership in Europe. While presidential approval has declined somewhat, the desirability of U.S. global leadership remained at the same level as last year among EU and Turkish respondents (see Chart 4). Just like last year, on average, 55% of
respondents in the European Union found it desirable that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs. Among the EU countries surveyed, the British were the most likely (74%) and the Slovaks the least likely (35%) to find U.S. leadership desirable. The desirability of strong U.S. leadership in world affairs increased by 12 points in Bulgaria (to 42%), 10 points in the U.K. (74%), and by four points in Portugal (59%), Romania (58%), and Poland (46%). It stayed essentially the same in the Netherlands (69%), Italy (55%), Spain (44%), Slovakia (35%), and Turkey (18%), but it dropped by six points in Germany (59%) and France (46%).

In general, this pattern of sustained support is good news for American foreign policymakers. Support for strong U.S. leadership is high compared with the pre-Obama period; in 2007 and 2008, only slightly more than one-in-three (36%) expressed that strong U.S. leadership is desirable. However, the fact that majorities in four countries — Turkey (67%), Spain (53%), Slovakia (52%), and France (51%) — found strong U.S. leadership undesirable indicates the limits of a popular American president.

Not only did the desirability of U.S. leadership stabilize, but the percentage of EU respondents (71%) who agreed that the United States and the European Union have enough common values to cooperate on international problems remained unchanged since last year. This represents a considerable increase when compared to 2008 (58%).

**EU LEADERSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS**

Despite the restructuring of the EU leadership that accompanied ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, views on EU leadership did not change much on the whole. The overwhelming majority of Europeans (78%) and Americans (72%) still found it desirable that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs. The Germans (87%), Italians (85%), and Portuguese (84%) were among the most likely to support strong EU leadership. This year, the British
were more likely to find EU leadership desirable (73%) than they were last year (61%).

The Turks, generally very skeptical about Western leadership in world affairs, were somewhat less critical of European than American leadership. Eighteen percent of the Turks found U.S. leadership desirable but 27% thought EU leadership desirable. Still, the majority (56%) found it undesirable that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs — unchanged from last year.

**EU–U.S. RELATIONS GENERALLY GOOD**

Majorities of American (54%) and EU (58%) respondents agreed that relations between the United States and the European Union are good. Very few in the European Union and the United States (4%) described the relations as bad. Roughly one-in-three in the European Union (36%) and two-in-five in the United States (41%) saw relations as mixed. Italians were the most likely to say that EU–U.S. relations are good (76%), followed by Germans (68%), while the British (42%), French (47%), Polish (48%), and Romanians (49%) were the least likely to say so.

**DIRECTION OF EU–U.S. RELATIONS DIVIDES THE TRANSATLANTIC PUBLIC**

When respondents living within the European Union were asked whether relations between Europe and the United States improved over the last year, a plurality (48%) said relations stayed the same, an eight-point increase over last year. Those who thought relations had improved dropped by nine points to 32%. Last year’s optimism toward Obama was reflected in the fact that more than half of the French (52%) and the Germans (53%) indicated that relations between Europe and the United States improved in 2009, but this number dropped to 39% and 35%, respectively. While a plurality of Americans (40%) also said relations stayed the same, more than a third (36%) said they have gotten worse, a 10-point increase compared with last year. In the EU countries surveyed, fewer than one-in-five (17%) thought relations deteriorated — virtually unchanged from 2009 (15%). However, there was a 10-point increase in the U.K. (28%) among those who thought transatlantic relations became worse over the last year.
Section Two: A Crisis of the Euro but not the European Union

It sent shockwaves across Europe when the European Commission condemned Greece on January 12, 2010, for falsifying data on its public finances and hindering the collection of accurate statistics about its true debt. By April, Prime Minister George Papandreou formally requested a $60 billion (€47 billion) aid package, describing the Greek economy as "a sinking ship."

As interviews for Transatlantic Trends were conducted between June 1 and June 29, 2010, the saga of the euro was unfolding with no clear outcome yet in sight. Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal responded to the crisis by introducing austerity packages. Also in June, strikes by Greek and Spanish workers marked public opposition to these measures.

The economic troubles of Greece and its potential effect on the other countries that share the same currency created the first real test for the 16-country-strong eurozone and beyond. It was especially unfortunate that the sovereign debt crisis happened on top of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. Continued public concern about the global economy was evident in this year’s survey. A plurality of those polled in the European Union (36%), a five-point increase over last year, continued to indicate that managing the global economy should be the top priority for the American president and European leaders. The shape of the economy continued to hurt many families. Last year, a majority of EU respondents (55%) indicated that they or their families had been personally affected by the current economic crisis. This trend slightly increased this year as 60% of Europeans reported being personally affected by the crisis. In the Netherlands, the percentage of those reporting they were affected by the crisis doubled from 20% to 40% since last year. Seventy-eight percent of the Portuguese, 71% of the Spanish, and 67% of the Italians reported that they were affected by the crisis. Romanians (89%) and Bulgarians (84%) were most likely to report feeling the effects of the economic crisis.

EURO NOT APPEALING, BUT MANY SEE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF EU

There was little enthusiasm for Europe’s common currency in the countries surveyed that use the euro (see Chart 5). When asked whether using the euro has been a good or bad thing for their country’s economy, respondents were mostly negative. With few exceptions, the majorities in the eurozone countries in the survey said the euro has been a bad thing for their economy, including the two economic powerhouses of Europe, France (60%) and Germany (53%), but also Spain (53%) and Portugal (52%).

Italians were divided on the benefits of the euro with 47% saying the euro has been good and 48% saying it has been bad for their economy. Only the Dutch (52%) and Slovaks (64%) had majorities saying the euro has been a good thing.

The euro was not appealing from the outside either. Majorities of the British (83%) and Polish (53%), and a plurality of Bulgarians (42%) thought that using the euro would be a bad thing for their economies. Only in Romania (54%) did the majority feel that adopting the euro would be a good thing for the domestic economy.

Despite the severity of the sovereign debt crisis and the intensity with which it was debated within the European Union, majorities did not seem to blame the European Union for the crisis of the euro. Majorities in Europe continued to think that strong EU leadership is desirable. When asked specifically about the economy, the majority of
EU respondents (63%) agreed that being a member of the European Union, the world’s biggest economy, has been a good thing for their country’s own economy. This opinion was especially common in the Netherlands (75%), Poland (75%), Germany (69%), Portugal (69%), Slovakia (68%), and Spain (67%). On the other hand, Bulgarians (40%) and the British (45%) were the least positive about the economic benefits of their EU membership. But in France, where most were negative about the euro, the majority (61%) still agreed that EU membership has been a good thing for their economy. Around the same percentage of Italians (62%) thought that EU membership has been good for their economy.

**ECONOMIC CRISIS: A MODEST COMMITMENT TO BUILDING A STRONGER EUROPEAN UNION**

The Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis left Europeans somewhat unsure about the euro but still committed to the European Union as an economic entity. Public opinion seems to support the argument that crises tend to lead to more citizen support for integration rather than less. More than half of EU respondents (57%) felt that economic difficulties should lead to greater commitment to build a stronger European Union. Italians (76%), Portuguese (70%), Bulgarians (66%), Spaniards (65%), and Slovaks (64%) were especially favorable toward more integration; on the other hand, the generally Euro-skeptic British (33%) were the least likely to say so.

**LOCUS OF ECONOMIC DECISIONMAKING**

While there is relatively strong public commitment to a more robust European Union, the plurality of EU respondents (46%) also believe that in dealing with the current economic crisis, each country’s national government should have primary responsibility. Roughly two-in-five EU respondents (39%) said that the European Union should have primary responsibility for handling the current economic crisis. Only in Germany, often described as “Europe’s locomotive,” did the majority (54%) agree that the European

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**Chart 5:**
**EU Membership Versus the Euro**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EU Membership Has Been/Would be a Good Thing for the Economy</th>
<th>Using the Euro Has Been/Would be a Good Thing for the Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU11</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) Eurozone countries

Q29, 30
Union should have the primary responsibility for economic decision-making. This option was the least popular in the U.K. (25%), Bulgaria (24%), Slovakia (22%), and Romania (15%). The French were divided on this issue, with 47% saying the national government and 43% saying the EU should have the primary responsibility.

**STRONG COMMITMENT TO FREE MARKETS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION REMAINS**

Europeans, just like Americans, are even more dedicated to the basics of their economic system following the crisis. Overwhelming majorities of American (90%) and EU (72%) respondents agreed that people are better off in a free-market economy. The pro-free-market sentiments of the British (81%) and the Germans (78%) almost rival those of the Americans. However, there was one exception to this trend. This year, a plurality of Turks (45%) disagreed with the benefits of a free-market economy, perhaps signaling even more public resistance to the Western way of doing things. The percentage of those in Turkey who agreed that people are better off in a free-market economy dropped 10 points to 36%.

Support for the free market does not come at the expense of governments. A large majority of those surveyed inside the EU (78%) and Turkey (55%) continue to agree that the government has an essential role to play in regulating the market. The French (88%), British (86%), and Portuguese (85%) were among the most likely to agree with the government’s role in regulating the market. Somewhat less enthusiastically than those living within the EU, the majority of Americans (69%) also agreed — with one-in-three agreeing strongly — that the government plays an essential regulatory role. Free market principles and government regulation, often contrasted by the media and politicians, enjoy parallel support by the public.
From Afghanistan to Iran to NATO’s strategic review, security issues have dominated the transatlantic agenda over the past year. And while last year’s improvement in the American president’s popularity was accompanied by increased support for transatlantic cooperation on some security issues, this cooperation is not without obstacles, which originate in different values, perceptions, and subsequent policy preferences.

Few issues have been as prominent and lingering in headlines on both sides of the Atlantic as the war in Afghanistan. Last winter, Obama conducted a long and public review of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, resulting in an increase of 30,000 American troops. Meanwhile, disheartening news from the front lines, scandals, and declining public support led to political troubles in many capitals across Europe. Even during this survey’s fieldwork, headlines reported the controversy over former Afghanistan Commander General McChrystal’s interview in Rolling Stone magazine that led to his resignation on June 23, 2010.
INCORPORATING WAR FATIGUE

Although all surveyed countries had troops stationed in Afghanistan at the time of the fieldwork, differing perspectives on the purpose and prospects of their missions have always been a strain on the transatlantic relationship (see Chart 6). As in previous years, the United States was the only country in which a slight majority of respondents (51%) felt optimistic about stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, but this figure was still down five points from 2009. At the same time, only about one-quarter of EU respondents (23%) felt the same optimism, down nine points from last year. Germany (10%) was the least optimistic, and France (18%) followed close behind. Twenty-eight percent of Italians were optimistic about Afghanistan, somewhat higher than the EU11 average, but still an 11-point drop from last year’s results.

When asked whether to increase, maintain, reduce, or withdraw all troops, most countries showed an increase in desire to withdraw all troops (see Chart 7). A plurality of EU respondents (44%) said that their country should withdraw all troops, up from 39% in 2009. The majority of Poles (59%) and half the Germans (50%) agreed with that course of action, reflecting an eight- and nine-point increase, respectively, from last year. A majority of EU respondents (64%) thought that their country should either reduce or withdraw troops, while only 41% of U.S. respondents felt the same, up from 30% in 2009. The United States was the only country in which a majority of the population (58%) supported either increasing or maintaining troop levels in Afghanistan. Italians were divided over what to do with the troops; around one-third (34%) want to remain at current level and another third (35%) want to withdraw all troops.

However, when respondents were reminded of Obama’s plan to start withdrawing troops in 2011 if conditions permit, the number of Europeans who wanted to start withdrawing troops immediately was only 36%, while in the United States it was 21%. Almost two-in-five EU respondents (39%) said their country should wait until 2011 and withdraw if conditions permit, compared to 33% in the United States. Only one-fifth of EU respondents (22%) said it was too early to set a timetable and that troops should remain as long as it takes to stabilize Afghanistan. A plurality of Americans (45%) said it was too early to set a timetable, but clear partisan differences emerged with 34% of Democrats, 70% of Republicans, and 47% of independents agreeing.

Last year, Transatlantic Trends revealed that Americans and Europeans in the survey did not differentiate much between the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — showing similar levels of optimism toward both wars. This year, however, Americans (59%) and EU respondents (28%) were slightly more optimistic about stabilizing Iraq than they were Afghanistan (51% and 23%, respectively). The United States remains the only country where a majority feels optimistic about the situation in Iraq, with the U.K. (43%) the next most optimistic.

IRAN: EUROPEAN CARROT AND AMERICAN STICK

The overwhelming majority of American (86%) and EU (79%) respondents were somewhat or very concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons (see Chart 8), ranging within the EU from the least-concerned Slovaks (66%) to the most-concerned Italians (88%). Those who were very concerned were concentrated in the United States (69%),
Italy (63%), Germany (61%), and Portugal (60%). Within the United States, 60% of Democrats, 64% of independents, and 94% of Republicans were very concerned. Turkey was the only country in which fewer than half of respondents (40%) were concerned.

Despite sharing a similar level of concern in the United States and the EU, there were differing opinions about how best to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. A plurality of EU respondents (35%) preferred offering economic incentives, while a plurality of Americans (40%), regardless of political preference, favored economic sanctions. Roughly twice as many American (25%) as EU (13%) respondents favored providing support to the opposition of the current government in Tehran.

There was also little support in the EU countries polled (6%) and the United States (4%) for simply accepting that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons while other options were on the table. About an equal number of Turks said that accepting a nuclear Iran (25%) or imposing economic sanctions (24%) were the best options. Very few respondents in the EU (6%), the United States (9%), and Turkey (3%) preferred military action over other options.

However, while very few American and EU respondents favored military action as a viable option as mentioned above, changing the context of the situation led to much different results. The respondents who chose one of the nonmilitary options in the preceding question were then asked to imagine that all nonmilitary options had been exhausted and were given the choice between accepting a nuclear Iran and taking military action. In this scenario, a plurality of Europeans (43%) and a majority of Americans (64%) favored military action. The U.K. (57%) and Turkey (54%) were the only two countries where a majority of respondents would accept a nuclear Iran over military action under these circumstances.

NATO GLOBAL ROLE POPULAR DESPITE AFGHANISTAN

As the NATO summit in Lisbon approaches this November, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are debating the institution’s proper role in the world. This year’s survey shows that, despite the public growing tired of the war in Afghanistan, majorities or pluralities in all countries surveyed still support NATO being prepared to act outside of Europe (see Chart 9). In fact, large majorities in the EU (62%) and the United States (77%) — the highest of any country surveyed — said that NATO should be prepared to act outside of Europe to defend members from threats to their security. The countries where only a plurality — rather than a majority — supported this were Turkey (48%), Bulgaria (45%), and Romania (42%). When asked whether NATO should limit its mission to defending members attacked in Europe, only one-in-three EU respondents (32%) and one-in-five Americans (21%) agreed. Germany (41%), the U.K. (38%), and Romania (37%) were the most supportive of limiting NATO’s mission to act within Europe’s borders.

Support for NATO has often been considered a general measure of commitment for membership in the Western alliance. A solid majority of American (60%) and EU (59%) respondents said NATO was essential for their country’s security, and these numbers increased by five points in Eastern Europe. While there was majority support for NATO this year, looking at long-term trends, support for NATO has decreased over the years. In 2002, around seven-
in-ten EU respondents (69%) felt NATO was essential. In some cases, the decline was dramatic; for example 74% of the Germans said NATO was essential for their country’s security in 2002, but only 56% felt that way in 2010. Similarly, 68% of Italians felt NATO was essential in 2002, but only 54% felt so this year. There was virtually no difference in NATO support in France and the Netherlands between 2002 and 2010.

Despite majorities in most countries feeling positively toward NATO, only pluralities of EU respondents (42%) and Americans (45%) agreed that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the EU should become closer. The most intense supporters of closer ties remain in Romania (56%), Italy (53%), and Spain (52%). On the other hand, pluralities in the Netherlands (47%), the U.K. (45%), France (45%), Portugal (45%), Germany (39%), and Slovakia (33%) thought that the EU should take a more independent approach from the United States. While the number of respondents choosing a more independent approach increased in several countries compared to 2009, the desire to work together remained much higher than before Obama took office.

**COMMON VALUES BUT SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES**

One of the most deeply rooted transatlantic value differences can be found in general attitudes toward the use of military force. While Americans (77%) and EU respondents (71%) continued to feel they share enough common values to work together on international problems, when asked whether they agree that war is necessary to obtain justice under some circumstances, three-quarters of Americans (77%) and only one-quarter of EU respondents (27%) agreed. Although both numbers are up slightly from last year, these numbers have largely remained the same over the past several years and represent a significant and lasting divide in American and European public opinion. The U.K. (61%) remains the only European country where a majority of the population agrees with this sentiment. The differences are even more pronounced when considering 49% of Americans and only 8% of EU respondents agree strongly.

On the other hand, despite these differences, this year’s results show a convergence in European and American attitudes about importance of economic power vis-à-vis military power. As in past years, Europeans polled (86%) responded that economic power is more important in world affairs than military power. This year, a similarly strong majority of Americans (78%) agreed with this statement, compared to 61% in 2009.
Transatlantic relations are not just about North America and Europe anymore. Many challenges the transatlantic community faces, such as international terrorism or scarcity of resources, are global in nature. The rise of Asian countries both as economic and military rivals is one of the most important tests of the transatlantic relationship. The question is open whether competition with China or India brings the two sides of the Atlantic closer or separates them further.

**TOMORROW’S WORLD LEADERS**

For the first time, Transatlantic Trends asked respondents how likely it is that certain countries and organizations will exert strong leadership in world affairs five years from now. Opinions on the future strength of India and China are markedly different in the United States and Europe (see Chart 10).

The overwhelming majority of EU respondents (81%) predicted that the United States is likely to exert strong leadership in the future, and a strong majority (75%) also said that the European Union will exert strong leadership.
However, fewer people (68%) said that China will exert strong leadership. Roughly half of the EU respondents (53%) thought that Russia will. When asked about India, the majority of EU respondents (54%) thought it was unlikely that the world’s most populous democracy will exert strong leadership in world affairs five years from now and only a little more than two-in-five (41%) said it was likely.

Americans were very confident in the durability of U.S. power as 90% indicated that the United States will likely exert strong leadership in world affairs five years from now. Matching this, 91% of Americans also said that China will exert strong leadership. This is a 23-point difference between those in the United States and those in the EU who think of China as a major player five years from now. Seven-in-ten (71%) in America found it very likely that China will exert strong leadership in the future while only a third of European respondents (34%) thought the same scenario is very likely. Even those Europeans who were the most likely to see China as a future global power — the British (77%), Italians (75%), Germans (73%), and Spanish (73%) — were considerably less likely to think so than the average American. Central and East Europeans — Bulgarians (53%), Romanians (47%), and Poles (41%) — together with the Turks (34%) were the least likely to think of China as a future global superpower.

A large majority of Americans (84%) also found it likely that the European Union will exert strong leadership; more Americans thought so than did Europeans themselves. Unlike Europeans, however, a large majority of Americans (74%) said that India will exert strong leadership in the future. The intensity of belief in India’s future role is somewhat muted in America, as 30% thought it is very likely to happen while 44% thought it is somewhat likely. Close to the number on India, 71% of the U.S. public thought that Russia is likely to exert strong leadership in world affairs five years from now.

![Chart 11: Enough Common Values/Interests with China to Work Together](image-url)
CHINA DIVIDES THE TRANSATLANTIC PUBLIC

The question of having commonalities with China even further divides the two publics (see Chart 11). Around half of Americans (53%) agreed that the United States has enough common values with China to be able to cooperate on international problems.

In stark contrast, almost two-thirds of European respondents (63%) said that China and Europe have such different values that cooperating on international problems is impossible. However, publics within the European Union varied greatly in these opinions across countries. Fewer than one-in-five Germans (18%) said that Europeans and Chinese have enough common values to cooperate, but the Dutch (43%) and British (41%) were more than twice as likely to say so. Even the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were divided on this issue: 22% of Poles and 23% of Slovaks but 34% of Bulgarians and 37% of Romanians thought they had enough common values to cooperate.

While values were perceived to be very different between China and the European Union, the Europeans surveyed were somewhat more likely to say that China and Europe have enough common interests to be able to cooperate on international problems. Around two-in-five (39%) agreed that there are enough common interests between the EU and China to cooperate. But still, the majority of EU respondents (52%) felt that China and the EU have different interests. The French (57%), Germans (60%), and Slovaks (62%) were among the most likely to say that China and the EU have different interests.

Majorities in both the United States (52%) and the EU (57%) agreed that China is not a military threat. However, the margin in the United States is very narrow as 48% of Americans saw China as a military threat. Those living in the EU were somewhat less likely to see China as a military threat (35%) and only a small percentage (15%) of the Turks were likely to say the same.

The question of whether China is an economic threat or opportunity also shows that Americans and Europeans are equally divided, as roughly half (49%) on both sides of the Atlantic saw the country as more of an economic threat than an opportunity. There were considerable differences among the European nations polled about whether China is a prospect for new markets and investments. The Dutch (64%) and British (54%) were the most likely to see China in a positive light. On the other hand, people in Portugal (64%), France (63%), and Spain (58%) were the most likely to perceive China as an economic threat.

SIMILAR VIEWS ON CHINA’S INFLUENCE IN THE WORLD

The number of people who think China plays a positive role on a host of global issues is remarkably similar in Europe and the United States. Overall, China is not seen as having a positive influence on the world. Fewer than 20% of U.S. and EU respondents said that China plays a positive role in managing global conflicts, fighting poverty in the world, or fighting climate change.

Americans were much more likely than EU respondents to say that China tends to play a negative role in fighting climate change (74% vs. 55%) or managing international conflicts (58% vs. 32%) (see Chart 12). Overall, Europeans were more likely than Americans to say that the Chinese play neither a positive nor a negative role in the international arena.

China is seen more positively as a global economic power. Two-in-five American (40%) and EU (39%) respondents said that China tends to play a positive role in managing the world economy. However, only in the Netherlands (58%) was this a majority opinion, while only 22% of Turks agreed with the sentiment.

RELATIONS WITH CHINA: MIXED BUT NOT BAD

The majority of people surveyed in the EU (52%) and the United States (67%) feel that relations between Europe or the United States and China are mixed. Very few American (11%) and EU (10%) respondents said that relations with China are bad. However, EU respondents (31%) were somewhat more likely to describe their relations with China as good than Americans were (21%). Roughly one-in-three of the Spanish (39%), Romanians (38%), French (37%), Dutch
(37%), Bulgarians (36%), Italians (35%), and Turks (35%) rated relations with China as good.

TURKEY AND ASIA: NOT SO CLOSE

While Turkey is situated in both Europe and Asia, this geographic proximity does not make the Turkish public feel that they have much in common with China. A plurality of Turks thought they not only have different values (46%) but also have different interests (46%) than the Chinese. The high percentage of those (40% and 42%, respectively) who declined to answer this question is also notable, indicating that opinions on these issues are not yet formed. A plurality of Turks (41%) saw China as an economic threat instead of an opportunity, but a majority (57%) said China is not a military threat. Turks do not stand out from other European countries as being particularly afraid of Chinese competition. For example, 63% of the French saw China as an economic threat. Bulgarians (35%) and Romanians (26%), on the other hand, are among those who were the least likely to see China as a threat to their jobs and economic security.

Turks in general were just as skeptical as Europeans and Americans about the role China plays internationally. And they are even more negative on China’s role in managing the world economy. Only 22% of Turks saw China playing a positive role as opposed to nearly twice that in Europe (39%) and the United States (40%).
Turkish foreign policy occupied center stage in the media this year. On May 16, 2010, Brazil and Turkey reached a deal with Iran to swap nuclear fuel, and Turkey later voted “no” on a new round of economic sanctions against Iran during a UN Security Council meeting. Later in May, Israeli commandos raided an aid flotilla headed to Gaza which led to the death of nine Turkish activists and further strained Turkish-Israeli relations. Despite these difficulties, Turkey continues to be an important NATO member and a candidate for membership in the European Union. Recent events, however, have led many analysts to point to an increasingly assertive Turkish foreign policy. With no clear pattern in alliance-building with the West, Turkey is almost certainly moving in a direction of less predictability on foreign affairs, which American and European leaders need to account for in the future.

Turkish public opinion seems to reflect the country’s new focus on the Middle East. Compared with last year’s results, the percentage of Turks who said Turkey should act in closest cooperation with the countries of the Middle East on international matters doubled to 20% (see Chart 13). This was accompanied by a nine-point decline in those who said Turkey should cooperate with EU countries (13%) and those who said Turkey should act alone on international matters.

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<td>Russia</td>
<td>3</td>
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Chart 13: With Whom Should Turkey Act in Closest Cooperation?

Q27
matters (34%). Preferences to cooperate with Russia (5%) and the United States (6%) were equally low.

When asked what should be the top priority for the American president and European leaders, fighting international terrorism remained the top concern for a plurality of Turks (38%) — more so than the economy (21%). The number of Turks who thought working to ease tensions in the Middle East should be the top priority doubled from last year to 15%. The latter is another indicator of a stronger Turkish focus on its immediate neighbors.

**TURKEY ON IRAN: NOT A NUCLEAR THREAT**

The Turkish vote against sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council is not so surprising considering the plurality of Turks (48%) who were not concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. This is in sharp contrast with U.S. (86%) and EU (79%) respondents, where overwhelming majorities were concerned about a nuclear Iran. The intensity of concern is substantial as 49% of EU respondents and 69% of Americans were very concerned about Iran having nuclear weapons. In Turkey, roughly one-in-three (36%) were not at all concerned and only 18% were very concerned.

When presented with multiple options for dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, one-in-four Turks (25%) were willing to accept that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons while only 6% of EU respondents and 4% in the United States were willing to do so. Considering Turkey has extensive economic ties with Iran, including tourism, it is not so surprising that support for economic sanctions on Iran was fairly low in Turkey (24%) compared to American (40%) support. Most Turks did not support meddling with Iran’s internal politics, as only 6% said that providing support to opponents of the current government in Iran would be the best option to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This option was fairly popular in the United States (25%).

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* Uses EU7 for years 2002-2006 and EU11 for years 2007-2010 (please see methodology section)
DECLINING SUPPORT FOR NATO AND THE EU

The Turkish public often holds markedly different opinions on issues concerning values and attitudes related to foreign policy compared with its American and European Union counterparts. Such divergence raises the question of whether Turks still find NATO, the most emblematic organization of the Western alliance, essential to their own security. There has been a notable decline in support for NATO since the first wave of Transatlantic Trends was conducted in Turkey. The majority of Turks (53%) found NATO essential in 2004, but by 2010 this support had eroded significantly to less than one-in-three (30%).

The decline in support for the country’s European Union membership is even more dramatic (see Chart 14). In 2004, 73% of the Turkish public said membership would be a good thing, but the support dropped to 38% by 2010. This lack of enthusiasm toward membership is matched by those already in the European Union. The French (49%) and Germans (44%) were the most likely to say that Turkey’s EU membership would be a bad thing. Nevertheless, roughly half of EU respondents (51%) still believed that it is somewhat or very likely that Turkey will eventually join the European Union (see Chart 15). This forecast was not shared by the Turkish public as 63% think it is not likely that their country will join the European Union, including 34% of the public saying that it is not likely at all.

The American public continued its support for Turkey’s EU membership. Two-in-five Americans (41%) said that Turkey’s membership in the EU would be a good thing. This was roughly twice as much as the average support among the EU countries surveyed (23%). Only in Romania did a plurality (43%) of respondents believe that Turkey’s EU membership would be a good thing, showing more support for the idea than the Turks themselves (38%).

NOT ENOUGH COMMON VALUES WITH THE WEST

In 2008, a Turkish majority (55%) felt Turkey has such different values from the West that Turkey is not part of the West. By 2010, this percentage dropped to 48% but was still more than those who agreed that Turkey has enough common values with the West to be part of it (30%). A majority of EU respondents (58%) agreed that Turkey does not have enough common values to be part of the West. Germans (73%) were the most likely to say Turkey has different values from the West, while Romania was the only EU country surveyed where a slight majority (52%) felt that Turkey has enough common values with the West to be part of it.

Experts on Turkish foreign policy often emphasize that the country’s new, stronger regional role is built on the idea that Turkey will likely play a “soft power” role in the region. The majority of Turks (60%) indeed agreed that economic power is more important than military power. However, this level of support for soft power is much less than in the EU countries surveyed, where, on average, 86% of the public agreed that economic power is more important than military power. Americans were somewhat less likely to agree with the importance of economic power over military power, but 78% still agreed with this statement.

Forty-two percent of Turks agreed that under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice, a seven-point increase over last year. This is well above the average in the EU countries surveyed (27%) but much less than the United States (77%).
TURKS HURT BY THE ECONOMY
The percentage of those who say they or their families were affected by the economic crisis was remarkably high in Turkey (76%). This is despite the fact that the country exhibited impressive economic growth (around seven percent) even during the global economic crisis. It is also noteworthy that despite the overall gloomy attitude toward the European Union, a plurality (43%) believed that joining the EU would be a good thing for the Turkish economy. At the same time, Turkish public opinion stands out from the rest of the countries polled in that the plurality of respondents (45%) disagreed with the statement that people are better off in a free-market economy, a sharp increase from last year (31%).
Section Six: Poland — An Outlier in the European Union

Last year’s Transatlantic Trends report identified some key divergences in public opinion between Western European attitudes and those in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. While this year’s results show a warming of relations with the other Central European countries, Polish attitudes toward the United States remain comparatively lukewarm. This is despite the Obama administration’s efforts to improve relations over the last year through a series of high-level trips to the region and private meetings with Polish officials.

The Obama bounce in 2009 carried Polish public opinion with it, but not to the same extent it did in Western European countries surveyed. A longer-term perspective shows that Polish attitudes toward the United States and NATO experienced a considerable drop during the Bush years. While President Bush’s personal popularity was higher in Poland than in any other country surveyed, support for U.S. policy and NATO fell sharply in the wake of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2002, 64% of the Polish public found U.S. leadership desirable, which fell to 39% in 2004 and reached a low of 34% in 2008 (see Chart 16). Similarly, the percentage of Poles believing that NATO is still essential fell to 46% in 2007 from 64% in 2002.

Chart 16:
U.S. Leadership is Desirable

* Uses EU7 for years 2002-2006 and EU11 for years 2007-2010 (please see methodology section)
OBAMA’S REPORT CARD: A TOUGH GRADER

Polish attitudes toward Obama were generally positive, yet much less so than in other EU countries surveyed. When asked about Obama’s handling of relations with their country, only 53% of Poles approved — the least of any EU country surveyed and much lower than the EU average of 76%. For the second year in a row, fewer Poles (58%) than other EU respondents (78%) approved of Obama’s handling of international policies. The Polish public was also skeptical about Obama’s dealings with several foreign policy challenges. Poles disapproved of Obama’s managing of relations with Iran (56%) and work on easing the tensions in the Middle East (51%) — the highest disapproval rates among EU countries in the survey. Managing relations with Russia gets a slightly more positive mark, but only 52% of Poles approved — again the lowest among EU countries.

MOST EAGER TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN

For Poland, with approximately 2,500 troops in Afghanistan and intentions to start withdrawing in 2012, the war is the thorniest issue in transatlantic relations. Poles were the most critical of Obama’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan with a 61% disapproval rating. Similarly, 71% of Poles were pessimistic about the prospects for stabilizing Afghanistan — an increase of 15 points over last year and the biggest increase in pessimism among the surveyed countries. Poles were also the most eager to withdraw all troops with 59% of the public supporting that option and 45% believing troop withdrawal should start immediately. In both instances these are the highest percentages found in the survey.

LESS ATLANTICIST THAN OTHERS

Although Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries have long been viewed by some analysts as strong proponents of Atlanticism, this appears to be less the case now when compared to Western Europe. The desirability of U.S. leadership among Poles (46%) has improved slightly from 42% last year, but remains below the EU average of 55%. When asked about the future, comparatively few Poles (69%) thought that the United States is likely to exert strong leadership in world affairs five years from now, again the lowest rate among the EU publics. Most Poles (56%) thought that the U.S.–EU relationship had stayed the same over the last year while only 25% said it had improved.
A slim majority of the Polish public (52%) thought that NATO is still essential, but had the lowest level of support among all the EU countries surveyed. Yet Poles still believed in closer cooperation between the United States and the European Union, with 45% saying that the transatlantic partnership should become closer, which was slightly higher than the average in the EU countries surveyed (42%).

**EUROPE FIRST**
The Polish public remained strongly pro-Europe. A large majority of Poles (70%) found it desirable that the European Union play a greater leadership role in world affairs, compared to 46% support for U.S. leadership (see Chart 17). Poles were also optimistic that this would be the case, with 74% saying it was likely that the European Union will exert strong leadership in world affairs in five years. A large majority of the Polish public (75%) also believed that EU membership has been a good thing for the Polish economy, compared to an EU average of 63%. Yet at the same time, only 32% thought that Poland using the euro would be a good thing, well below the EU average of 38%.

**FEWER ECONOMIC WOES**
Poles seem to have largely avoided feeling squeezed by the economic crisis — a majority (53%) said that they were not personally affected by it, only the Dutch (59%) felt less affected. Notably, in Poland the number of people who felt personally affected by the economic crisis dropped — six points — compared to 2009. Poles were divided about U.S. leadership in economic affairs — 45% saw it as desirable and 41% as undesirable — but a clear majority (70%) supported EU leadership in world economic affairs. The majority of the Polish public was also concerned with the economic rise of China — 59% see China as an economic threat, compared to the 49% EU average.
TNS Opinion was commissioned to conduct the survey using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews in all countries except Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitated the use of face-to-face interviews.

In all countries, a random sample of approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years of age and older, was interviewed. Interviews were conducted between June 1, 2010 and June 29, 2010.

The U.S. survey fieldwork was carried out by a new survey organization in 2010. This resulted in some changes in trend data due to different interviewing protocols used by the new survey organization, a phenomenon called “house effect.” Specifically, the results showed a drop in the number of “don’t know” responses. For this reason, some of the questions were asked again from a representative sample of 456 Americans between July 29, 2010 and August 4, 2010. This time, interviewers were retrained to be more in line with previous years’ protocols. For questions Q1b_1, Q11, Q25b, and Q26, the results of the new survey were reported after a careful comparison of the data from the two surveys.

For results based on the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus three percentage points. For results based on the total European sample, the margin of error is plus or minus one percentage point. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can also introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

For trended questions, averages were weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country to maintain consistency with previous years’ reports. For new questions, the results were also weighted so that the sample matches certain population characteristics, including age, gender, and education.3

When processing is complete, data from the survey are deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan (ICPSR), the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut, and the GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences and are available to scholars and other interested parties.

3 Trend Questions: 1a_1, 1a_2, 1b_1, 1b_2, 4, 6_1, 6_2, 7, 8a, 8b, 9, 10, 11, 13.1, 13.2, 14, 18, 22, 23, 25a, 25b, 26, 27, 32, 33.1, 33.2, 33.3, 33.4, 33.5, 36a, 38, 39

New Questions: 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 8c.1, 8c.2, 8c.3, 8c.4, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21.1, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4, 24.1, 24.2, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36b

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NOTE ON EUROPEAN AVERAGES

Over time, additional European countries have been added to the survey. While the addition of new countries has affected the Europe-wide average, the impact was not usually statistically significant. Therefore, for ease of presentation, we have treated several different averages as if they were part of one average: EU7 average is treated as part of EU11 average where data for EU11 is not available before 2007.

TABLE OF EUROPEAN AVERAGES REPORTED

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<td>EU11</td>
<td>2007–2010</td>
<td>EU7 countries plus Spain, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For more detailed methodology and topline data, please visit www.transatlantictrends.org
Notes
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