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Women's attitudes to the European Union

**A typology of public opinion among Europe's women
(Eurobarometer N°47.1)**

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It provides a source of information about the attitudes of women towards the European Union in 1997.

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1. Introduction

In the analysis of public opinion towards the European Union women are frequently treated as one homogeneous group. As a single unit, they are compared to other groups within the population. Hence one often reads, for instance, that women hold less favourable opinions towards the European Union than men do. Although this is certainly true, more in-depth analyses of the female population of Europe indicate that as a group they represent a broad spectrum of opinion towards the European Union.

The focus of this report is **to investigate the various degrees of support or opposition to the European Union that exist within the female population of Europe**¹. We have done this by carrying out a statistical procedure, called cluster analysis², which identifies distinct groups within a given (women in this case) population.

We have taken a number of questions asked on the **Eurobarometer Survey**³ which measure public opinion towards the European Union, analysed the women's response and have subsequently grouped the women into distinct clusters according to their views.

Clearly, our questions do not cover the totality of attitudes towards the European Union. However, on the basis of what was covered on the survey, we were able to identify the **existence of five groups within the female population**, each group having a **distinct set of views on the European Union**.

A similar report on the typology of women's opinions towards the European Union was produced by INRA for the Public Opinion Analysis Unit (DG X.A.2) in July 1994. A typology on the opinion of the young appeared in June 1995. Typologies of the general population were written in July 1994 and May 1995⁴.

¹ Throughout this report the female population represents women aged 15 and over, living in the 15 Member States of the European Union.

² See Appendix C for a description of the statistical analyses carried out in this study.


³ Eurobarometer 47.1 - see Appendix D for technical details of the survey.

⁴ Copies (in French) of these reports are available upon request.

2. Five distinct sets of attitudes towards the European Union

European women do not all think alike when it comes to the European Union. **The female population of Europe can be divided into five distinct attitudinal groups, ranging from very pro-European to very anti-European.** The statistical procedure we carried out placed each female respondent in the sample in one of these five groups depending on how she responded to the questions about the European Union asked on the survey.

The pie below shows how the female population is divided into these five attitudinal clusters:



1. **The Sympathisers:** one quarter of the female population in Europe want a strong and large European Union that decides policy issues.
2. **The Pragmatics:** 20% of the female population have rationally decided that the European Union represents a positive development. However, as a result of their rationality, they are less inclined than the Sympathisers to give the EU as much decision-making powers.
3. **The 'Middle-of-the-roaders':** 14% of the total female population in Europe are ambivalent about the Union, supporting some issues and opposing others.
4. **The Undecisives:** 22% of the female population are fairly uninterested in the European Union and often lack an opinion on issues related to the Union. When they do have an opinion, it tends to be fairly negative.
5. **The Sceptics:** for 19% of the female population, the European Union represents something that is less positive than what they have known so far – the concept of independent nation states. They are the strongest opposers of the Union.

Typology of European women

The following table shows how the five groups are represented within the Member States of the European Union.

Table 1.1 ⁵	% Sympathisers	% Pragmatics	% “Middle-of- the-roaders”	% Undecisives	% Sceptics
Belgium (n=225)	30	19	9	22	20
Denmark (n=115)	5	19	30	19	27
Germany n=1849)	22	19	15	33	13
Greece (n=227)	26	25	12	9	28
Spain (n=865)	35	17	15	19	15
Finland (n=110)	3	12	36	14	36
France (n=1233)	25	28	11	18	19
Ireland (n=89)	17	26	30	14	14
Italy (n=1310)	43	23	9	16	8
Luxembourg (n=9)	33	33	11	11	11
Netherlands (n=332)	27	30	12	22	9
Austria (n=180)	14	19	14	24	29
Portugal (n=220)	23	14	13	15	35
Sweden (n=191)	11	9	26	15	39
UK (n=1265)	13	13	15	27	33
All Women (n=8220)	25	20	14	22	19

Clearly, attitudes differ significantly depending on the country in which the women live. On the basis of the schema above we can identify pro-European and anti-European countries.

There are 8 **pro-European** countries where a majority of the women are Sympathisers or Pragmatics. These are **Italy**, **Luxembourg** (both 66%), **the Netherlands** (57%), **France** (53%), **Spain** (52%), **Greece** (51%), **Belgium** (49%) and **Ireland** (43%). Germany is the only founding member of the European Union which does not belong to this group.

7 countries are **anti-European** where the Undecisives or Sceptics represent the largest proportion of women. These are **the UK** (60%), **Sweden** (54%), **Austria** (53%), **Portugal**, **Finland** (both 50%), **Germany** and **Denmark** (both 46%). In this group we find all the new Member States and the typically Eurosceptic nations. It is surprising to find that half of the Portuguese women are either Undecisives (15%) or Sceptics (35%), as Portugal is not generally considered as a nation of anti-Europeans. Germany belongs to this category of nations because of the large proportion of Undecisives. For women from the former Republic of East Germany, the EU represents a new concept while women from West Germany have generally become less supportive of the Union ever since the reunification of Germany.

In **Finland** (36%), **Denmark**, **Ireland** (both 30%) and **Sweden** (26%) a significant proportion of the female population is neither pro- nor anti-European (i.e. the ‘Middle-of-the-roaders’). In the anti-European countries of Finland, Sweden and Denmark this means that convincing this group of the

⁵ See Appendix A for summary information on the profiles of the clusters. Note that because the data are weighted by population size the sample size varies per country and is particularly small in Luxembourg.

advantages of membership could turn the tide in favour of the European Union. In the Irish Republic care must be taken that this group does not move to the anti-European camp.

3. The Sympathisers

As we have seen, Sympathisers represent the largest proportion of European women (25%). What distinguishes these women from the rest is that **the large majority of them want political responsibility to lie with the European Union rather than with their respective national governments.**

3.1 Who are the Sympathisers?

As the table below show, more than 4 in 10 **Italian women** are Sympathisers. In **Spain, Luxembourg and Belgium**, they are also well represented. In Finland and Denmark, on the other hand, we find very few Sympathisers.

Table 3.1	% of Sympathisers
<i>Italy</i>	43
<i>Spain</i>	35
<i>Luxembourg</i>	33
<i>Belgium</i>	30
<i>Netherlands</i>	27
<i>Greece</i>	26
EU average	25
<i>France</i>	25
<i>Portugal</i>	23
<i>Germany</i>	22
<i>Ireland</i>	17
<i>Austria</i>	14
<i>UK</i>	13
<i>Sweden</i>	11
<i>Denmark</i>	5
<i>Finland</i>	3

In terms of age, the Sympathisers differ from the average European woman in that they **tend to be a bit younger**. Half of the Sympathisers are younger than 40, compared to 43% of all European women.

Table 3.2	Sympathisers	All Women
<i>Age:</i>	%	%
<i>15 – 24</i>	19	16
<i>25 – 39</i>	31	27
<i>40 – 54</i>	24	22
<i>55+</i>	26	35
Average age	42 years	45 years

Typology of European women

Sympathisers tend to have **stayed in full-time education longer** than the average European woman and are more likely to still be in school (due to the fact that they tend to be younger).

Table 3.3	Sympathisers	All Women
<i>Left school at age:</i>	%	%
<i>15 or younger</i>	28	33
<i>16 – 19</i>	41	41
<i>20 or older</i>	20	17
<i>Still studying</i>	11	9
Average	17 years	17 years

The fact that the average age of Sympathisers is lower than that of all women, explains why they are **more likely to be students** and **less likely to be retired**.

Table 3.4	Sympathisers	All Women
<i>Main economic activity:</i>	%	%
<i>Self-employed</i>	7	6
<i>Manager/ Professional</i>	8	7
<i>Employee</i>	20	20
<i>Manual worker</i>	9	10
<i>Housewife</i>	22	22
<i>Student</i>	12	9
<i>Unemployed</i>	7	7
<i>Retired</i>	15	20

The Sympathisers do not differ significantly from the average European woman in terms of their political orientation except that they are somewhat **more likely to place themselves on the left-hand side** of the political scale.

Table 3.5	Sympathisers	All Women
<i>Self placement on political scale:</i>	%	%
<i>Most left</i>	4	4
<i>2</i>	5	4
<i>3</i>	13	10
<i>4</i>	10	10
<i>5</i>	26	25
<i>6</i>	9	9
<i>7</i>	7	8
<i>8</i>	5	6
<i>9</i>	1	2
<i>Most right</i>	2	2
<i>Refuse to state</i>	9	8
<i>Don't know</i>	10	12
Average	4.81	5.06

Typology of European women

With regards to obtaining news through the media, 51% of Sympathisers read a daily paper at least several times a week, compared to an average of 54%. Only 14% say they never read a daily paper, compared to 16% of all women.

Table 3.6	Sympathisers	All Women
<i>Reads news in daily papers:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	33	38
<i>Several times a week</i>	18	16
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	19	16
<i>Less often</i>	16	15
<i>Never</i>	14	16

Like most women, Sympathisers are much more likely to obtain news information by watching television than through other media sources.

Table 3.7	Sympathisers	All Women
<i>Watches news on TV:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	72	69
<i>Several times a week</i>	17	19
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	6	7
<i>Less often</i>	3	3
<i>Never</i>	2	2

Sympathisers are no different from the average European woman in their use of the radio to obtain news with around 4 in 10 doing this on a daily basis.

Table 3.8	Sympathisers	All Women
<i>Listens to news on radio:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	41	41
<i>Several times a week</i>	17	16
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	8	8
<i>Less often</i>	16	16
<i>Never</i>	19	18

More than 4 in 10 **Sympathisers rank above average in their opinion leadership qualities.** What this means is that they are more inclined than the average European woman to try to convince their friends of an issue they feel strongly about and to hold political discussions.

Table 3.9	Sympathisers	All Women
<i>Opinion leadership:</i>	%	%
<i>Very high</i>	9	8
<i>Above average</i>	33	30
<i>Below average</i>	38	38
<i>Very low</i>	20	25

3.2 The views of the Sympathisers


3.2.1 Who should take decisions?

The Eurobarometer 47.1 survey presented respondents with a list of 18 policy areas and asked them whether they thought each area should be decided by their respective national governments or jointly within the EU⁶.

The Sympathisers differ significantly from the rest of the female population in their response to this question. On average, **they want decision-making responsibilities to lie with the EU for 15 of the 18 policy areas listed.** This is much higher than the 9 policy areas that the average European female wants the EU to decide.

There is some variation between the Sympathisers depending on where they live: the French, Greek and Portuguese want the highest number of policy areas to be decided jointly within the EU, whereas Sympathisers from Finland, Sweden, UK, Austria and Denmark (all Eurosceptic nations) are slightly more restrictive in their views.

Support for joint EU decisions
(Average number of policy areas by country)



The graph shows that **Sympathisers from all Member States** want a larger number of policy areas to be decided jointly within the EU than their fellow countrywomen do. The **difference in opinion is the largest in the anti-**

⁶ See Q.23 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the question.


European nations (i.e. Portugal, the UK, Sweden, Austria, Denmark and Finland)⁷.

3.2.2 Which areas should be decided jointly by the EU?

As we have seen, the Sympathisers want the EU to jointly take decisions for 15 of the 18 areas. However, levels of support vary depending on the area.

Support is highest in areas where the problems transcend national borders, such as the fight against drugs, the Third World, foreign policy towards non-EU countries, scientific and technological research and rules for political asylum. These areas should be the responsibility of the EU according to more than 9 in 10 Sympathisers.

Support is a bit lower for areas that have a more national character, such as the media and workers' rights is lower. However, even in these areas, the majority of Sympathisers are in favour of decision-making at the EU level.




The graph shows that the **Sympathisers are resoundingly more supportive of joint EU decisions** than the female population in general is. The most marked differences are found in the areas of **education, health & social welfare and cultural policy**, where support among the Sympathisers is more than twice the average.

⁷ In these countries, Sympathisers represent only a small proportion of the female population. In Finland, this is 3%.

3.2.3 Attitudes towards enlargement

The Sympathisers not only want a powerful Europe that can take decisions but they also want a large Europe: in comparison to other women, **they are significantly more supportive of new countries joining the Union**. The Eurobarometer presented respondents with a list of 17 countries and asked them for each country whether they were in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future⁸.



As the graph above shows, around 3 in 4 Sympathisers believe that Switzerland and Norway should join. Support is also high for Iceland and Malta. Furthermore, around half of the Sympathisers want Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Cyprus to join, the four countries that form the top of the list for accession talks with the European Commission. The two other countries on that list (Estonia and Slovenia) receive approval of less than half of the Sympathisers.


3.2.4 Support for current policy issues

Nearly 9 in 10 Sympathisers believe that **the Member States of the European Union should have a common defence and military policy**, compared to only 66% of all European women⁹.

⁸ See Q. 20 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the question.


⁹ See Q.22 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the question.

“The European Union should have a common defence and military policy”



Sympathisers are also more likely than other women to favour a **common foreign policy towards countries outside the EU**.


“The Member States should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside of the EU”



More than 8 in 10 Sympathisers feel that the Member States should have this policy compared to only 6 in 10 women in general.

Support for a **single European currency** is also significantly higher among the Sympathisers than it is among other women.

“There should be one single currency, the Euro, replacing the national currencies of the Member States of the EU”



Three in four Sympathisers believe that the Euro should replace their respective national currencies, compared to less than half of the total female population in Europe.

3.2.5 Support for the European Union

Sympathisers outnumber other women significantly in their levels of support for the European Union. **63% regard membership to the EU as a good thing and only 5% regard it as a bad thing¹⁰.**

Table 3.10	Sympathisers	All Women
<i>Membership to EU is:</i>	%	%
<i>A good thing</i>	63	42
<i>Neither good nor bad</i>	24	33
<i>A bad thing</i>	5	15
<i>Don't know</i>	8	11

More than half of the Sympathisers believe that their country has on balance benefited from membership to the European Union¹¹.

Table 3.11	Sympathisers	All Women
<i>Country has on balance:</i>	%	%
<i>Benefited from membership</i>	51	37
<i>Not benefited</i>	24	37
<i>Don't know</i>	25	26

¹⁰ See Q.15 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the question.


¹¹ See Q.16 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the question

As the table above shows, Sympathisers are significantly less likely than other women to feel that their country has not benefited, while the proportion who can't judge is almost the same.

3.2.6 Feeling European

Not surprisingly, **the Sympathisers are more likely than other women to feel European.** In response to a question which allowed respondents to choose out of four options ranging from seeing themselves as 'nationality only' to 'European only' in the near future, 8% of Sympathisers choose the last option, compared to only 4% of all women¹².

At the other end of the scale, we find that only 30% of the Sympathisers don't feel European at all, compared to 48% of all women.



3.2.7 Are the Sympathisers dissatisfied with democracy in their country?


As the graph below shows, Belgian and Italian Sympathisers are the least satisfied with democracy in their country (the higher the score, the more dissatisfied). In both Belgium and Italy, Sympathisers also represent the largest proportion of women. This raises the question whether there is a relationship between being sympathetic towards the EU and being dissatisfied with the way democracy works in one's own country¹³.

¹² See Q.19 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the question.

¹³ See Q.41 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the question.

However, as the graph shows, the average level of satisfaction is nearly the same for Sympathisers as it is for all women (2.7 and 2.6, respectively)¹⁴.

Levels of satisfaction with democracy in country
(average scores by country*)



* Average scores are computed by assigning a score of 1 to 'very satisfied' and a score of 4 to 'not at all satisfied'

As in most other countries, there are no significant differences between Belgian or Italian Sympathisers and Belgian and Italian women in general. The only countries where there are significant differences between Sympathisers and other women are Finland, Portugal and Denmark: in these countries, **Sympathisers are more satisfied with democracy.**

It therefore seems that, with the exception of these three countries, **satisfaction with democracy in one's own country does not make people more or less sympathetic towards the European Union.**

4. The Pragmatics

Two in ten Europeans have rationally come to the conclusion that the unification of Europe represents a positive development in the history of Europe.

4.1 Who are the Pragmatics?

The largest proportions of Pragmatics are found in **Luxembourg**, the **Netherlands** and **France**. They also represent around a quarter of the female population of **Ireland** and **Greece**.

¹⁴ At the EU level no significant statistical relationships were found between satisfaction with democracy in country and the number of areas respondents want to be decided jointly within the EU neither for Sympathisers nor for European women in general.

Typology of European women

Table 4.1	% of Pragmatics
<i>Luxembourg</i>	33
<i>Netherlands</i>	30
<i>France</i>	28
<i>Ireland</i>	26
<i>Greece</i>	25
<i>Italy</i>	23
EU average	20
<i>Belgium</i>	19
<i>Denmark</i>	19
<i>Germany</i>	19
<i>Austria</i>	19
<i>Spain</i>	17
<i>Portugal</i>	14
<i>UK</i>	13
<i>Finland</i>	12
<i>Sweden</i>	9

In terms of age, **Pragmatics are very similar to the Sympathisers**, with around half aged below 40.

Table 4.2	Pragmatics	All Women
<i>Age:</i>	%	%
<i>15 – 24</i>	20	16
<i>25 – 39</i>	31	27
<i>40 – 54</i>	21	22
<i>55+</i>	28	35
Average age	42 years	45 years

Having noted that the Pragmatics use rationality to form their opinions, it is not surprising to find that they are the **most well educated group of women**. On average they have stayed in full-time education until the age of 18 with nearly a quarter having stayed on until they were aged 20 or older.

Table 4.3	Pragmatics	All Women
<i>Left school at age:</i>	%	%
<i>15 or younger</i>	21	33
<i>16 – 19</i>	42	41
<i>20 or older</i>	24	17
<i>Still studying</i>	14	9
Average	18 years	17 years

As with the Sympathisers, the fact that the average age of Pragmatics is lower than that of all women explains why they **are more likely to be students and less likely to be retired**. However, unlike the Sympathisers, they are also **more likely to hold managerial or professional positions and less likely to be housewives**.

Typology of European women

Table 4.4	Pragmatics	All Women
<i>Main economic activity:</i>	%	%
<i>Self-employed</i>	8	6
<i>Manager/ Professional</i>	10	7
<i>Employee</i>	19	20
<i>Manual worker</i>	8	10
<i>Housewife</i>	19	22
<i>Student</i>	14	9
<i>Unemployed</i>	6	7
<i>Retired</i>	16	20

As can be seen from the table below, the political orientation of Pragmatics is very similar to that of most other European women.

Table 4.5	Pragmatics	All Women
<i>Self placement on political scale:</i>	%	%
<i>Most left</i>	4	4
<i>2</i>	4	4
<i>3</i>	13	10
<i>4</i>	12	10
<i>5</i>	24	25
<i>6</i>	9	9
<i>7</i>	8	8
<i>8</i>	8	6
<i>9</i>	3	2
<i>Most right</i>	3	2
<i>Refuse to state</i>	6	8
<i>Don't know</i>	8	12
Average	5.07	5.06

Pragmatics (56%) are somewhat more likely than other women (54%) to read the news in daily papers at least several times a week.

Table 4.6	Pragmatics	All Women
<i>Reads news in daily papers:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	38	38
<i>Several times a week</i>	18	16
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	16	16
<i>Less often</i>	17	15
<i>Never</i>	11	16

Pragmatics are just as avid television viewers as most other women.

Typology of European women

Table 4.7	Pragmatics	All Women
<i>Watches news on TV:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	68	69
<i>Several times a week</i>	20	19
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	8	7
<i>Less often</i>	3	3
<i>Never</i>	1	2

Their use of the radio for news information is very similar to that of other women.

Table 4.8	Pragmatics	All Women
<i>Listens to news on radio:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	42	41
<i>Several times a week</i>	16	16
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	10	8
<i>Less often</i>	17	16
<i>Never</i>	16	18

Nearly half of the Pragmatics **rank above average in their opinion leadership qualities**. Like the Sympathisers, they are more inclined than the average European woman to try to convince their friends of an issue they feel strongly about and to hold political discussions.


Table 4.9	Pragmatics	All Women
<i>Opinion leadership:</i>	%	%
<i>Very high</i>	9	8
<i>Above average</i>	37	30
<i>Below average</i>	39	38
<i>Very low</i>	14	25

4.2 The views of the Pragmatics

4.2.1 Feeling European

The large majority of Pragmatics feel European to some extent and only 11% say that in the near future they will see themselves as belonging only to their nationality. Yet, many Pragmatics put their own nationality before their European identity (73%) as a way of saying “yes I feel European, but I can’t deny the fact that I am a citizen of my country”. This is a sign of the rationality of the Pragmatics.

National or European identity?



Nonetheless, 6% of Pragmatics feel European only and for a further 8%, feeling European comes before their own nationality.

4.2.2 Support for the European Union

Of the five attitudinal clusters we have identified, **the Pragmatics are the most supportive of their country’s membership to the European Union.** They are also more likely than the other groups to be of the opinion that **their country has benefited from membership to the Union.**

Around two in three Pragmatics regard their country’s membership to the European Union as a good thing, whilst only 3% think it is a bad thing.

Table 4.10	Pragmatics	All Women
<i>Membership to EU is:</i>	%	%
<i>A good thing</i>	67	42
<i>Neither good nor bad</i>	22	33
<i>A bad thing</i>	3	15
<i>Don’t know</i>	7	11

More than 6 in 10 Pragmatics also feel that their country has benefited from EU membership. Only 15% feel that their country has not benefited.

Table 4.11	Pragmatics	All Women
<i>Country has on balance:</i>	%	%
<i>Benefited from membership</i>	63	37
<i>Not benefited</i>	15	37
<i>Don’t know</i>	22	26


4.2.3 Support for joint EU decision-making

Compared to the Sympathisers, the Pragmatics are significantly more restrained when it comes to giving the EU the power to take decisions. The average number of areas to be decided jointly within the EU is 9 for the Pragmatics compared to 15 for the Sympathisers. **As such, the Pragmatics do not differ very much from the average European woman.**

However, as the next graph shows, in the traditionally Eurosceptic nations of Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, Pragmatics are different from their fellow countrywomen in wanting the EU to decide more areas.

Pragmatics from Italy and Greece, on the other hand, believe the EU should decide fewer areas than their fellow countrywomen want.

Support for joint EU decisions
(Average number of policy areas by country)



4.2.4 Supporters of subsidiarity


Pragmatics have a very clear view about the level at which decisions should be taken. They seem to understand the concept of subsidiarity, in that they believe that issues which can be tackled better through joint rather than individual action should be dealt with by the EU while decisions that can be taken close to the citizen at the national level do not need to go through the EU.

Like most women, the large majority believe that it is **better to have joint action on issues related to the Third world and scientific and technological research.** However, the Pragmatics stand out in also wanting

Typology of European women

the EU to deal with areas that they regard as being of mutual interest to all the Member States. Hence, **70% of Pragmatics believe the EU rather than national governments should deal with currency**, compared to only 48% of all women.

% in favour of joint EU decisions



The graph also shows that Pragmatics are significantly more likely than other women are to believe that decisions regarding cultural policy, health & social welfare or education should be taken close to the citizen, that is at least at the national level.


4.2.5 Support for current policy issues

Pragmatics are very supportive of a number of policy issues that are currently on the EU's agenda.

According to the Pragmatics, one of the Union's main tasks is to protect the Member States against outside threats. **Their support for a common defence policy is already highlighted in the previous graph, which shows that 65% of Pragmatics want the EU, rather than their national governments, to take decisions regarding defence.**


When asked the more direct question - "are you for or against the European Union Member States having a common defence and military policy?" - the views of the Pragmatics are even more pronounced: **94% say they are in favour, compared to 66% of all women.**

“The European Union should have a common defence and military policy”



With 8 in 10 Pragmatics believing that the Member States should have a common foreign policy towards countries outside of the European Union, they are also much more supportive than the average woman is on this issue.


“The Member States should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside of the EU”



There is also widespread support among the Pragmatics to replace the national currencies by the Euro. We have already shown that 70% of Pragmatics believe the EU should take decisions pertaining to monetary

issues. **74% of Pragmatics support a single European currency**, compared to only 43% of all European women.

“There should be one single currency, the Euro, replacing the national currencies of the Member States of the EU”



4.2.6 Attitudes towards the unification of Europe

The Eurobarometer survey presented respondents with a list of 9 items and asked them to choose 3 areas which should be their national governments' most important priority and 3 areas which they would personally be most willing to commit themselves to¹⁵.

Compared to other women, **the Pragmatics are more likely to think that their national governments should address the unification of Europe as one of its most important priorities**. Together with the Sympathisers, they are also **most willing to commit themselves personally to the unification of Europe**.


Table 4.12	% saying unification is most important priority	% most willing to commit themselves to unification
Pragmatics	13	6
<i>Sympathisers</i>	9	6
<i>'Middle-of-the-roaders'</i>	5	3
<i>Undecisives</i>	3	3
<i>Sceptics</i>	4	3

¹⁵ See Q.44 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the question.

As the table above shows, 13% of Pragmatics regard the unification of Europe as one of their governments' most important priorities. 6% of Pragmatics furthermore say that the unification of Europe is one of the things they are most willing to commit themselves to.

4.2.7 Attitudes towards enlargement

Having seen that Pragmatics want Europe to be able to defend itself against outside threats and regard the unification of Europe as an important priority, it is not surprising to find that, like the Sympathisers, **they think more positively about enlargement than other women do.**




The graph above shows that Pragmatics are more likely than other women to believe that each of the countries that were mentioned in the questionnaire should become part of the European Union in the near future.

However, even for the Pragmatics, not every country that is geographically a part of Europe should be allowed to join into the European Union. As the graph shows, there are quite a few countries that receive support from less than half of the Pragmatics, including Estonia and Slovenia that have been shortlisted for accession talks.


4.2.8 Knowledge about the European Union

We conclude the section on the Pragmatics with an investigation into how informed they feel about the European Union. Levels of knowledge and

feeling informed about the EU are generally low among the European public and particularly so among women. Whilst this also applies to Pragmatic women, their levels are not as low as those of other women.



Pragmatics are significantly more likely than other women to feel they know how the European Union is organised and works and significantly less likely to feel they know it not well at all. They are also more likely to feel well informed about the EU, as can be seen in the graph below¹⁶.



¹⁶ See Qs. 8 and 9 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the questions.

5. The Undecisives

Having discussed the two pro-European groups, we now move to the two more anti-European groups. We will discuss the group that is neither pro-European nor anti-European, that is the 'Middle-of-the-roaders', last.

The **Undecisives** represent 22% of the female population. This group defines itself by often lacking an opinion when it comes to the European Union. On the whole, however, the views of the **Undecisives** tend to be more negative than positive.

5.1 Who are the Undecisives?

Germany, and especially the **former East Germany** (38% vs 31% in the West), has the largest proportion of Undecisives. For many East German women the idea of being part of the EU is clearly something new and very different. The high proportion of Undecisives in **the UK** may in part be due to the fact that information campaigns about the European Union have been sparse there whilst media coverage has tended to be negative.

	% of Undecisives
<i>Germany</i>	33
<i>UK</i>	27
<i>Austria</i>	24
<i>Belgium</i>	22
<i>Netherlands</i>	22
EU average	22
<i>Denmark</i>	19
<i>Spain</i>	19
<i>France</i>	18
<i>Italy</i>	16
<i>Portugal</i>	15
<i>Sweden</i>	15
<i>Finland</i>	14
<i>Ireland</i>	14
<i>Luxembourg</i>	11
<i>Greece</i>	9

With an average age of 49, the Undecisives **are significantly over-represented in the oldest age category.**

	Undecisives	All Women
<i>Age:</i>	%	%
<i>15 – 24</i>	14	16
<i>25 – 39</i>	22	27
<i>40 – 54</i>	22	22
<i>55+</i>	43	35
Average age	49 years	45 years

More than 80% of the Undecisives left full-time education before their 20th birthday, which is below the average. Due to the fact that they tend to be older, they are also less likely to still be students.

Table 5.3	Undecisives	All Women
<i>Left school at age:</i>	%	%
<i>15 or younger</i>	42	33
<i>16 – 19</i>	42	41
<i>20 or older</i>	12	17
<i>Still studying</i>	5	9
Average	16 years	17 years

Also due to their age, **nearly a quarter of Undecisives are retired**. Within the active population, we find that Undecisives are the **more likely than average to be manual workers**.

Table 5.4	Undecisives	All Women
<i>Main economic activity:</i>	%	%
<i>Self-employed</i>	5	6
<i>Manager/ Professional</i>	4	7
<i>Employee</i>	21	20
<i>Manual worker</i>	12	10
<i>Housewife</i>	22	22
<i>Student</i>	5	9
<i>Unemployed</i>	6	7
<i>Retired</i>	24	20

Sixteen percent of Undecisives do not know where to place themselves on the left-right political scale. Women in this group that did place themselves tended to opt for a slightly more right-of-centre position.

Table 5.5	Undecisives	All Women
<i>Self placement on political scale:</i>	%	%
<i>Most left</i>	3	4
<i>2</i>	3	4
<i>3</i>	7	10
<i>4</i>	10	10
<i>5</i>	24	25
<i>6</i>	11	9
<i>7</i>	7	8
<i>8</i>	6	6
<i>9</i>	2	2
<i>Most right</i>	2	2
<i>Refuse to state</i>	8	8
<i>Don't know</i>	16	12
Average	5.19	5.06

Typology of European women

The Undecisives differ from the average woman in that they are **more extreme in their readership of the daily newspapers**. They are both more likely to read the papers everyday and to not read the papers at all.

Table 5.6	Undecisives	All Women
<i>Reads news in daily papers:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	42	38
<i>Several times a week</i>	14	16
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	13	16
<i>Less often</i>	13	15
<i>Never</i>	18	16

Their pattern of television viewership does not differ from the norm.

Table 5.7	Undecisives	All Women
<i>Watches news on TV:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	69	69
<i>Several times a week</i>	20	19
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	6	7
<i>Less often</i>	3	3
<i>Never</i>	2	2

In terms of radio listenership, the behaviour of the Undecisives again matches the norm.

Table 5.8	Undecisives	All Women
<i>Listens to news on radio:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	42	41
<i>Several times a week</i>	17	16
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	8	8
<i>Less often</i>	16	16
<i>Never</i>	17	18


The Undecisives are **significantly less likely than the average women to be opinion leaders**, with 33% scoring very low on the index. This finding is expected, as people who find it difficult to form an opinion are very unlikely to try to convince others of something they don't have.

Table 5.9	Undecisives	All Women
<i>Opinion leadership:</i>	%	%
<i>Very high</i>	6	8
<i>Above average</i>	24	30
<i>Below average</i>	38	38
<i>Very low</i>	33	25


5.2 The views of the Undecisives

5.2.1 Feeling informed about the European Union

The best way to begin describing the views of the Undecisives is by showing the extent to which these women **feel ill informed** about the European Union.




As the graph above shows, **only 7% of Undecisives say they know ‘very well’ or ‘quite well’ how the European Union is organised and works.**



Furthermore, **only 11% say they feel ‘very well’ or ‘quite well’ informed about the European Union, its policies and its institutions.**

The Undecisives are not a particularly inquisitive group: less than 2 in 10 feel that they really need to know a lot more about the European Union while 38% are happy with what they already know¹⁷.



Thus, **the European Union does not appear to be a topic of great interest** for this group, which in part explains their indecisiveness.

5.2.2 Support for the European Union

The Undecisives are not significantly more likely than other women to regard membership to the European Union as a bad thing. **Rather, the majority feel unable to make a judgement with 45% perceiving membership as neither good nor bad and 17% saying they don’t know.**

Table 5.10

	Undecisives	All Women
<i>Membership to EU is:</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>
<i>A good thing</i>	19	42
<i>Neither good nor bad</i>	45	33
<i>A bad thing</i>	19	15
<i>Don’t know</i>	17	11

More than 3 in 10 Undecisives don’t know whether their country has benefited from membership to the European Union. **However, the negative tendencies of this group towards the Union are clear with 52% saying that their country has not benefited.**

¹⁷ See Q.10 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the question.


Typology of European women

	Undecisives	All Women
<i>Country has on balance:</i>	%	%
<i>Benefited from membership</i>	15	37
<i>Not benefited</i>	52	37
<i>Don't know</i>	33	26

5.2.3 Who should make policy decisions?

The Undecisives are somewhat less supportive of EU joint decision-making than the average European woman is. The average level of support among the Undecisives for the 18 areas listed in the questionnaire is 44%, compared to 50% of all European women.

The graph also shows that **on average 18% of the Undecisives don't know who should decide**. For the total female population, this is only 8%.




The rank order of support for EU decision-making does not differ significantly from that of the Sympathisers or the Pragmatics: areas that do not directly affect the daily lives of these women, such as drugs or the Third World, receive the highest levels of support whereas policies that have a national character such as education and health & social welfare receive the lowest levels of support. However, **Undecisives differ significantly from the two pro-European groups in their levels of support**. For instance, only 27% of Undecisives want the EU to decide currency issues, compared to 84% of Sympathisers and 70% of Pragmatics.

5.2.4 Support for current policy issues

Having noted that only 27% of Undecisives want the EU to be involved in currency matters, it is not surprising to find **large opposition among this group towards the introduction of the single European currency.**

“There should be one single currency, the Euro, replacing the national currencies of the Member States of the EU”




Only 16% of Undecisives are for the Euro, compared to 43% of all European women. Again, the percentage of Undecisives that lack an opinion is significantly above average (20% and 15%, respectively).

Undecisives are less opposed to some of the other current policy issues. As the next charts show, **more than half support a common foreign policy (53%). At 68%, support for a common defence and military policy is particularly high.**

The indecisiveness of this group is again evident: **30% of Undecisives hold no opinion on the issue of a common foreign policy (compared to an average of 21%) and 25% hold no opinion on the issue of a common defence and military policy (compared to an average of 16%).**


Typology of European women

“The Member States should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside of the EU”



As a result of the high levels of indecisiveness among this group, the percentage that oppose a common foreign policy is actually below average (17% vs. 19%).

“The European Union should have a common defence and military policy”




As can be seen from the graph above, **Undecisives score above average in their levels of support for a common defence and military policy.** Only 7% are against it, compared to 17% of the total female population in Europe.

5.2.5 Feeling European

Another characteristic of the Undecisives is **their complete lack of a European identity**. Of the five groups, they are the least likely to feel European and the most likely to identify solely with their own nationality.

National or European identity?



More than 8 in 10 Undecisives say that in the near future they see themselves as their nationality only while a mere 2% think they will see themselves as European only or as European first and their nationality second.

Thus, **the concept of an integrated Europe is something that lies outside the realm of reality for the Undecisives**. Not only does the European Union not interest them particularly (something which can be either a result of, or due to, their uninformedness), they also don't identify with it. Although these women are clearly not as opposed to the European Union as the Sceptics, due to their characteristics, chances of them becoming pro-European are small.

6. The Sceptics

Nineteen percent of female population holds mostly negative views towards the European Union. **The majority of these women prefer their national governments over the EU to decide policy areas and they are more likely than any other group to regard membership to the EU as a bad thing.**

6.1 Who are the Sceptics

In **Sweden**, nearly 4 in 10 women are Sceptics, followed closely by **Finland** and **Portugal**. We also find large proportions of women from other traditionally Eurosceptic countries, like **the UK** and **Austria**, belonging to this group.

Table 6.1	% of Sceptics
<i>Sweden</i>	39
<i>Finland</i>	36
<i>Portugal</i>	35
<i>UK</i>	33
<i>Austria</i>	29
<i>Greece</i>	28
<i>Denmark</i>	27
<i>Belgium</i>	20
<i>EU average</i>	19
<i>France</i>	19
<i>Spain</i>	15
<i>Ireland</i>	14
<i>Germany</i>	13
<i>Luxembourg</i>	11
<i>Netherlands</i>	9
<i>Italy</i>	8

Of the five groups, **the Sceptics are on average the oldest**, with nearly half of them aged 55 or over.

Table 6.2	Sceptics	All Women
<i>Age:</i>	%	%
<i>15 – 24</i>	10	16
<i>25 – 39</i>	21	27
<i>40 – 54</i>	21	22
<i>55+</i>	47	35
<i>Average age</i>	<i>51 years</i>	<i>45 years</i>

The Sceptics also represent **the least well-educated group**, a fact which is certainly influenced by their age as in the past women were far less likely to stay in education as long as they are today.

Table 6.3	Sceptics	All Women
<i>Left school at age:</i>	%	%
<i>15 or younger</i>	45	33
<i>16 – 19</i>	39	41
<i>20 or older</i>	11	17
<i>Still studying</i>	5	9
<i>Average</i>	<i>16 years</i>	<i>17 years</i>

Typology of European women

Compared to the other groups in the female population, the Sceptics **are the most likely to be retired or to be housewives.**

Table 6.4	Sceptics	All Women
<i>Main economic activity:</i>	%	%
<i>Self-employed</i>	5	6
<i>Manager/ Professional</i>	4	7
<i>Employee</i>	18	20
<i>Manual worker</i>	10	10
<i>Housewife</i>	24	22
<i>Student</i>	5	9
<i>Unemployed</i>	5	7
<i>Retired</i>	29	20

Sceptics are somewhat more likely than the average woman to refuse to state or not know their political orientation. Politically, they are **the most right of centre group.**

Table 6.5	Sceptics	All Women
<i>Self placement on political scale:</i>	%	%
<i>Most left</i>	4	4
<i>2</i>	4	4
<i>3</i>	7	10
<i>4</i>	8	10
<i>5</i>	25	25
<i>6</i>	8	9
<i>7</i>	7	8
<i>8</i>	8	6
<i>9</i>	3	2
<i>Most right</i>	3	2
<i>Refuse to state</i>	9	8
<i>Don't know</i>	15	12
Average	5.28	5.06

The Sceptics (20%) are **significantly more likely than other women (16%) to not read the papers at all.**

Table 6.6	Sceptics	All Women
<i>Reads news in daily papers:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	40	38
<i>Several times a week</i>	12	16
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	15	16
<i>Less often</i>	13	15
<i>Never</i>	20	16

In terms of television viewership their pattern fully matches that of the average woman.

Table 6.7	Sceptics	All Women
<i>Watches news on TV:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	69	69
<i>Several times a week</i>	19	19
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	7	7
<i>Less often</i>	3	3
<i>Never</i>	2	2

When it comes to radio listenership, we see that Sceptics **are the least likely group to engage in this activity.**

Table 6.8	Sceptics	All Women
<i>Listens to news on radio:</i>	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	39	41
<i>Several times a week</i>	15	16
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	8	8
<i>Less often</i>	17	16
<i>Never</i>	20	18

The Sceptics are **even less likely than the Undecisives to be opinion leaders.** Only 28% score above average on the index, compared to 38% of all women. For 34% of Sceptics, the level of opinion leadership is very low.


Table 6.9	Sceptics	All Women
<i>Opinion leadership:</i>	%	%
<i>Very high</i>	6	8
<i>Above average</i>	22	30
<i>Below average</i>	38	38
<i>Very low</i>	34	25

6.2 The views of the Sceptics

6.2.1 Fear of European integration

Whilst Sceptics only make up 19% of the total female population, **they represent 34% of the women for whom European integration is one of the three most worrisome issues of our time.** It is indicative of the Sceptics to be over-represented in this respect.

**European integration is one of the three political issues of our time
that I am most worried about
(N=260)**



6% of Sceptics mention European integration as one of the most worrisome issues of our times, compared to 3% of all women. There is thus a small core of Sceptics for whom the thought of European integration is more worrisome than issues such as AIDS, poverty, racism or unemployment in Europe.¹⁸

In a number of countries the proportion of Sceptics with this concern far outnumbers the average. These are the Netherlands (Sceptics 14% - Dutch average 3%), the UK (Sceptics 12% - British average 7%) and Germany (Sceptics 6% - German average 3%). In the other countries, the Sceptics do not differ significantly from other women.

6.2.2 Support for joint EU decision-making


One of the characteristics of the Sceptics **is the fear that their country will lose sovereignty in important policy areas**. This is clear from the low levels of support for joint EU decision-making obtained from this group.

Sceptics, on average, want the European Union to decide 2 of the 18 areas listed in the questionnaire. This is significantly below the average of 9 areas for all women. Analyses of country results show that Sceptics from the Netherlands and Italy are willing to let the EU take decisions in 4 areas, whereas those from Portugal and Greece on average would give the EU the power to decide only 1 area.

¹⁸ See Q.43 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the question.


Typology of European women

**Support for joint EU decisions
(Average number of policy areas by country)**



As can be seen from the graph below, Sceptics are significantly **less willing than other women to give the EU decision-making powers** in all the areas that the survey questioned them about.

% in favour of joint EU decisions




Only 33% of Sceptics want the EU to decide issues relating to the Third world (compared to 72% of all women). Largest opposition to EU joint decision-making is found for health & social welfare issues (3%).

6.2.3 Support for current policy issues

As expected, only a small proportion of the Sceptics supports the current EU policy issues covered in the survey.

“The European Union should have a common defence and military policy”



Less than 4 in 10 Sceptics agree with the statement that “the European Union should have a common defence and military policy”. Compared to other women, they are more than twice as likely to disagree.


Country analyses reveal that Greek Sceptics (47%) are significantly more likely than other Sceptics to support a common defence and military policy. The political tensions with Turkey seem to force some Greek Sceptics to set aside their dislike of the European Union on this issue. The Italian Sceptics rank second on this issue, perhaps as a result of the recent situation in Albania. Dutch (14%) and French (15%) Sceptics, on the other hand, are the most opposed to a common defence and military policy.

Support for a common foreign policy is even lower with only 3 in 10 Sceptics wanting the Member States to co-operate on this issue.

Whereas the Dutch Sceptics are most opposed to a common defence policy, country analyses show that they are most supportive of a common foreign policy (52%). The Netherlands is the only country where more than half of the Sceptics respond in the affirmative. Support is also above average in Greece (44%), Ireland (42%) and Italy (39%). It is lowest in Belgium (13%).


Typology of European women

“The Member States should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside of the EU”



Less than 2 in 10 Sceptics believe that the **EU should have a single currency** compared to more than 4 in 10 women in general.

“There should be one single currency, the Euro, replacing the national currencies of the Member States of the EU”



Country variations reveal that German (8%), Finnish, Austrian (both 11%) and Danish (13%) Sceptics are the least supportive of a single currency. Irish Sceptics, on the other hand, are the most supportive (42%), followed closely by those from Greece (40%).

6.2.4 Support for the European Union

Having noted that Sceptics are more likely than other women to worry about further European integration, significantly less willing to hand over decision-making powers to the EU and most opposed to some of the current policy issues, it is not surprising to find that **only a small minority of them regard their country's membership to the European Union as a good thing.**

Table 6.10	Sceptics	All Women
<i>Membership to EU is:</i>	%	%
<i>A good thing</i>	16	42
<i>Neither good nor bad</i>	36	33
<i>A bad thing</i>	35	15
<i>Don't know</i>	13	11

However, the table above shows that opposition is not as strong as one would imagine: less than 4 in 10 Sceptics completely oppose membership to the European Union, with a further 4 in 10 of the opinion that it is neither good nor bad.

Table 6.11	Sceptics	All Women
<i>Country has on balance:</i>	%	%
<i>Benefited from membership</i>	17	37
<i>Not benefited</i>	59	37
<i>Don't know</i>	24	26

Nearly 6 in 10 Sceptics feel their country has not benefited compared to an average of less than 4 in 10 women.

6.2.5 National identity


Compared to the other groups, **the Sceptics are significantly more likely to feel a sense of national pride.** More than 4 in 10 Sceptics say that they are very proud to hold their country's nationality¹⁹.

Table 6.12	Sceptics	All Women
<i>Levels of national pride:</i>	%	%
<i>Very proud</i>	41	28
<i>Fairly proud</i>	37	44
<i>Not very proud</i>	13	17
<i>Not at all proud</i>	7	6
<i>Don't know</i>	3	5

It is therefore not surprising to find that **83% of Sceptics identify themselves solely with their own nationality.** Only 2% say that in the near future they will regard themselves as Europeans with a further 2% feeling that their European identity will come before their national identity.


¹⁹ See Q. 40 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the question.

National or European identity?




6.2.6 Fear of the unknown

The Sceptics' feelings towards the European Union can be described as **conservative in the sense that the European Union represents a change from the status quo which worries them**. Perhaps due to their age, they show a preference for things to go back to the way they used to be.



As a group, they are **the most likely to feel that their present situation has got worse over the past five years**. As the next graph shows, they are also

the most likely to expect their personal situation to get worse over the next five years²⁰.



Only a quarter of Sceptic women believe their personal situation will improve over the course of the next five years compared to an average of 36%. If coping with their own future situation already proves difficult for many, coping with a changing Europe may prove too much for these women.

7. The ‘Middle-of-the-roaders’

The final section of this report deals with the smallest of the five groups, the **‘Middle-of-the-roaders’**. This group is ambivalent about the European Union, tending to be less pro-European than the Sympathisers and the Pragmatics and more pro-European than the Undecisives and Sceptics. Hence the name **‘Middle-of-the-roaders’**.

Since the results for this group are similar to the average of the 5 groups, comparing them to this average will not be very helpful. Instead, the ‘Middle-of-the-roaders’ will be compared to the total of the Sympathisers and Pragmatics on the one hand (who we will call the pro-Europeans to simplify matters) and the total of the Undecisives and Sceptics (who we will call the anti-Europeans) on the other hand.

²⁰ See Qs. 37 and 38 in Appendix B for the exact wording of the questions.

7.1 Who are the 'Middle-of-the-roaders'?

The 'Middle-of-the-roaders', who represent 14% of the total female population, are found mostly in the **Scandinavian countries** and **Ireland**. Only 9% of Belgian and Italian women belong to this group.

Table 7.1	% of 'Middle-of- the-roaders'
<i>Finland</i>	36
<i>Denmark</i>	30
<i>Ireland</i>	30
<i>Sweden</i>	26
<i>Germany</i>	15
<i>Spain</i>	15
<i>UK</i>	15
EU average	14
<i>Austria</i>	14
<i>Portugal</i>	13
<i>Greece</i>	12
<i>Netherlands</i>	12
<i>France</i>	11
<i>Luxembourg</i>	11
<i>Belgium</i>	9
<i>Italy</i>	9

The 'Middle-of-the-roaders' are a bit older than the pro-Europeans but significantly younger than the anti-Europeans.

Table 7.2	Pro- Europeans	'Middle-of- the-roaders'	Anti- Europeans
<i>Age:</i>	%	%	%
<i>15 – 24</i>	20	18	12
<i>25 – 39</i>	31	30	22
<i>40 – 54</i>	23	22	22
<i>55+</i>	27	30	45
Average age	42 years	43 years	49 years

On average they have stayed in school until they were 17.

Table 7.3	Pro- Europeans	'Middle-of- the-roaders'	Anti- Europeans
<i>Left school at age:</i>	%	%	%
<i>15 or younger</i>	25	29	43
<i>16 – 19</i>	41	40	41
<i>20 or older</i>	22	21	11
<i>Still studying</i>	13	10	5
Average	18 years	17 years	16 years

Typology of European women

Nearly a quarter of 'Middle-of-the-roaders' are **white-collar employees**. They are also somewhat more likely than the other two groups to be **unemployed**.

Table 7.4	Pro-Europeans	'Middle-of-the-roaders'	Anti-Europeans
<i>Main economic activity:</i>	%	%	%
<i>Self-employed</i>	8	6	5
<i>Manager/Professional</i>	9	7	4
<i>Employee</i>	20	24	19
<i>Manual worker</i>	8	10	11
<i>Housewife</i>	21	20	23
<i>Student</i>	13	10	5
<i>Unemployed</i>	7	9	6
<i>Retired</i>	16	16	26

With an average score of 5, the 'Middle-of-the-roaders are **also the most centrist group politically**.

Table 7.5	Pro-Europeans	'Middle-of-the-roaders'	Anti-Europeans
<i>Self placement on political scale:</i>	%	%	%
<i>Most left</i>	4	3	4
<i>2</i>	4	6	4
<i>3</i>	13	8	7
<i>4</i>	11	9	9
<i>5</i>	25	26	24
<i>6</i>	9	8	10
<i>7</i>	7	10	7
<i>8</i>	6	5	7
<i>9</i>	2	1	3
<i>Most right</i>	2	2	2
<i>Refuse to state</i>	8	8	9
<i>Don't know</i>	9	12	16
Average	4.93	5.00	5.23

In terms of newspaper readership, they are true 'Middle-of-the-Roaders'.

Table 7.6	Pro-Europeans	'Middle-of-the-roaders'	Anti-Europeans
<i>Reads news in daily papers:</i>	%	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	35	38	41
<i>Several times a week</i>	18	16	13
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	17	17	14
<i>Less often</i>	17	13	13
<i>Never</i>	13	15	19

Typology of European women

They report somewhat **lower levels of television viewership** than other women do, even with 66% of them saying that they do this everyday.

Table 7.7	Pro-Europeans	‘Middle-of-the-roaders’	Anti-Europeans
<i>Watches news on TV:</i>	%	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	70	66	69
<i>Several times a week</i>	18	20	19
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	7	7	7
<i>Less often</i>	3	4	3
<i>Never</i>	2	2	2

On the other hand, they are **the most avid listeners to the radio** as a news medium.

Table 7.8	Pro-Europeans	‘Middle-of-the-roaders’	Anti-Europeans
<i>Listens to news on radio:</i>	%	%	%
<i>Everyday</i>	41	43	40
<i>Several times a week</i>	17	16	16
<i>Once or twice a week</i>	9	9	8
<i>Less often</i>	16	15	17
<i>Never</i>	18	17	18

The ‘Middle-of-the-roaders’ are **slightly less likely to be opinion leaders** than the pro-Europeans but considerably more likely than the anti-Europeans.


Table 7.9	Pro-Europeans	‘Middle-of-the-roaders’	Anti-Europeans
<i>Opinion leadership:</i>	%	%	%
<i>Very high</i>	9	8	6
<i>Above average</i>	35	32	23
<i>Below average</i>	39	39	38
<i>Very low</i>	18	21	33

7.2 The views of the ‘Middle-of-the-roaders’

7.2.1 Support for the European Union


As expected, **the level of support for membership to the European Union among the ‘Middle-of-the-roaders’ lies roughly between that of the pro- and anti-Europeans.** They are less likely than the Pro-Europeans to believe that their country’s membership to the European Union is a good thing but more likely than the anti-Europeans to hold this view.

Membership to the European Union is ...




Whereas the majority of pro-Europeans feel that their country has on balance benefited from EU membership and the majority of anti-Europeans think the opposite, **the 'Middle-of-the-roaders' are more split: 36% believe their country has benefited while 37% feel their country has not benefited from membership.**

Perceived benefit of membership



7.2.2 Who should take decisions?

The 'Middle-of-the-roaders' want decision-making responsibilities to lie within the EU for 8 of the 18 policy areas listed.



As the graph above show, **their score lies between that of the pro- and anti-Europeans.** However, the distance between pro-Europeans and the 'Middle-of-the-roaders' is greater (5 areas) than the distance between the 'Middle-of-the-roaders' and the anti-Europeans (3 areas).


7.2.3 Which areas should be decided jointly by the EU?

As for the other groups, levels of support for EU joint decision-making vary depending on the area.

Support for EU joint decision-making is highest for areas that have a relatively small impact on the lives of Europeans such as the Third World, the fight against drugs, poorer regions and scientific and technological research. As the next graph shows, support for the EU to be involved in these areas is obtained from at least two-thirds of the 'Middle-of-the-roaders'.

For 'Middle-of-the-roaders, defence is clearly a matter for national governments to deal with: only 8% want the EU to take decisions in this area.


The 'Middle-of-the-roaders': who do they want to decide?



Furthermore, areas that are likely to have a direct impact on the daily lives of people, such as education, workers' rights and health & social welfare should also be decided by the respective national governments, according to the majority of 'Middle-of-the-roaders'.

7.2.4 Support for current policy issues


“The European Union Member States should have a common defence and military policy”



Typology of European women


As was shown in the previous section, the 'Middle-of-the-roaders' are particularly keen to maintain national sovereignty over defence matters. Not surprisingly, **59% oppose a common defence and military policy for the EU**, compared to 22% of anti-Europeans and only 2% of pro-Europeans.

“The Member States of the European Union should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside the EU”



They are also more likely than both the pro- and anti-Europeans **to oppose a common foreign policy**. Support is obtained from an equal proportion of both the 'Middle-of-the-roaders' and the anti-Europeans (43%).

“There should be one single currency, the Euro, replacing the national currencies of the Member States of the EU”




The 'Middle-of-the-roaders' behave more like one would expect when it comes to the single currency: **with 25% in favour, they are less supportive than the pro-Europeans (74%) but more supportive than the anti-Europeans (16%).**

7.2.5 Feeling European

The final section on the 'Middle-of-the-roaders' deals with the proportion among them that feel European.


Like the pro-Europeans, **the large majority feel to some extent European with 5% saying they feel European only.**



The 'Middle-of-the-roaders' can thus be characterised as a group of women who **on the whole tend to accept the existence of the European Union, who tend to recognise the benefits of membership and who tend to identify with Europe.** At the same time, these women **are not willing to give up the concept of separate nation states in Europe** and as such are fairly restrictive in the amount of responsibility they give to the European Union.

Appendix A: Cluster profiles

Distribution of clusters in the Member States



The Sympathisers (25%):

- tend to be **younger** than the average European woman.
- tend to have **stayed in full-time education longer** than the average European woman.
- are **more likely to be students** and **less likely to be retired** due to their age.
- are the **most left-of-centre** group politically.
- **rank above average** in their **opinion leadership qualities**.

The countries with the largest proportions of **Sympathisers** are **Italy** (43%), **Spain** (35%), **Luxembourg** (33%) and **Belgium** (30%).

The Pragmatics (20%):

- tend to be **younger** than the average European woman.
- are the **most well educated** group of women.
- are **more likely** than other women to **hold managerial or professional positions** and **less likely** to be **housewives**.
- are somewhat **more likely** than other women to **read the news in daily papers** at least several times a week.
- **rank above average** in their **opinion leadership qualities**.

The countries with the largest proportion of **Pragmatics** are **Luxembourg** (33%), **the Netherlands** (30%), **France** (28%), **Ireland** (26%) and **Greece** (25%).

The Undecisives (22%):

- tend to be **older** than the average European women.
- tend to have **left full-time education at an earlier age** than other women.
- are **more likely than average to be manual workers**. Due to their age, **nearly a quarter has retired**.
- are **most likely not to know** where to place themselves on the **left-right political scale**.
- are **more extreme** in their **readership of the daily newspapers** than other women.
- are **less likely** than the average European woman to be **opinion leaders**.

The countries with the largest proportion of **Undecisives** are **Germany** (33%), **the UK** (27%) and **Austria** (24%).

The Sceptics (19%):

- represent the **oldest** group of women.
- are the **least well educated** group.
- are the **most likely** to be **retired** or to be **housewives**.
- are the **most right-of-centre** group **politically**.
- are the **most likely** to **never read the news in daily papers**.
- are the **least likely** to listen to the **news on the radio**.
- **score the lowest** on the **opinion leadership index**.

The countries with the largest proportion of **Sceptics** are **Sweden** (39%), **Finland** (36%), **Portugal** (35%), **the UK** (33%), **Austria** (29%) and **Greece** (28%).

The 'Middle-of-the-roaders' (14%):

- tend to be **a bit older** than the **pro-Europeans** and **significantly younger** than the **anti-Europeans**.
- are **more likely than average** to be **white-collar employees** or to be **unemployed**.
- are the **most avid** users of the **radio** as a news medium.
- **score lower** than the **pro-Europeans** and **higher** than the **anti-Europeans** on the **opinion leadership index**.

The countries with the largest proportion of **'Middle-of-the-roaders'** are **Finland** (36%), **Denmark, Ireland** (both 30%) and **Sweden** (26%).

Appendix B: Exact wording of survey questions

Q. 8 – KNOWLEDGE OF HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION IS ORGANISED AND WORKS

“In general, would you say you know very well, quite well, not very well or not at all well how the European Union is organised and works?”

- 1) Very well
- 2) Quite well
- 3) Not very well
- 4) Not at all well
- 5) Don't know”

Q. 9 – LEVELS OF FEELING INFORMED ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION

“All things considered, how well informed do you feel you are about the European Union, its policies and its institutions?”

- 1) Very well
- 2) Quite well
- 3) Not very well
- 4) Not at all well
- 5) Don't know”

Q. 10 – DESIRE FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION

“Which of the following statements comes closest to your opinion?”

- 1) I really need to know a lot more about the European Union
- 2) I would like to have some more information about the European Union
- 3) As far as I am concerned I am happy with what I already know
- 4) Don't know”

Q. 15 – SUPPORT FOR MEMBERSHIP TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

“Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY'S) membership of the European Union is ... ?

- 1) A good thing
- 2) A bad thing
- 3) Neither good nor bad
- 4) Don't know”

Q. 16 – PERCEIVED BENEFIT OF MEMBERSHIP TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

“Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?”

- 1) Benefited
- 2) Not benefited
- 3) Don't know”

Q. 19 – NATIONAL VS. EUROPEAN IDENTITY

“In the near future, do you see yourself as ... ?

- 1) (NATIONALITY) only
- 2) (NATIONALITY) and European
- 3) European and (NATIONALITY)
- 4) European only
- 5) Don't know”

Q.20 SUPPORT FOR ENLARGEMENT

“For each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future?

- 1) Bulgaria
- 2) Cyprus
- 3) Czech Republic
- 4) Estonia
- 5) Hungary
- 6) Iceland
- 7) Latvia
- 8) Lithuania
- 9) Malta
- 10) Norway
- 11) Poland
- 12) Romania
- 13) Russia
- 14) Slovakia
- 15) Slovenia
- 16) Switzerland
- 17) Turkey”

Q. 22 – STATEMENTS ABOUT CURRENT POLICY ISSUES

“What is your opinion on each of the following proposals? Please tell me for each proposal whether you are for it or against it?

1. There should be one single currency, the Euro, replacing the (NATIONAL CURRENCY) and all other national currencies of the Member States of the European Union.
2. The Member States of the European Union should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside of the European Union.
3. The European Union Member States should have a common defence and military policy.”

Q. 23 - DECISION-MAKING POWER: NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OR EU?

“Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government and which should be decided jointly within the European Union?

- a) Defence
- b) Protection of the environment
- c) Currency
- d) Co-operation with developing countries, Third World
- e) Health and social welfare
- f) Basic rules for broadcasting and press
- g) Workers' rights vis-à-vis their employers
- h) Immigration policy
- i) The fight against unemployment
- j) Agriculture and Fishing policy
- l) Supporting regions which are experiencing economic difficulties
- m) Education
- n) Scientific and technological research
- o) Rates of VAT (Value Added Tax)
- p) Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union
- q) Cultural policy
- r) Rules for political asylum
- s) The fight against drugs”

Q. 40 – LEVELS OF NATIONAL PRIDE

“Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be (NATIONALITY)

- 1) Very proud
- 2) Fairly proud
- 3) Not very proud
- 4) Not at all proud
- 5) Don't know”

Q. 41 – SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN (COUNTRY)

“Would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Fairly satisfied
- 3) Not very satisfied
- 4) Not at all satisfied
- 5) Don't know”

Q. 43 – MOST AND LEAST CONCERN FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES OF OUR TIME

“I am going to read out a list of some of the big political and social issues of our time.

a) Could you please tell me which three you are most worried about?

b) And which three are you the least worried about?

- 1) International economic competition/The globalisation of the economy
- 2) Poverty
- 3) Unemployment in Europe
- 4) Racism
- 5) The ageing population
- 6) The environment
- 7) Immigration
- 8) European integration
- 9) Crime
- 10) The loss of traditional values
- 11) AIDS
- 12) Drug abuse
- None of these (SPONTANEOUS)
- Don't know”

Q. 44 – PRIORITIES OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS / RESPONDENTS

“a) Could you please tell me which three of the following aims you think the (NATIONALITY) government should address as a priority? b) And which are the three aims you personally would be most willing to commit yourself to?

- 1) Equality of men and women
- 2) Protection of the environment
- 3) Defence of (OUR COUNTRY)
- 4) Unification of Europe
- 5) Fight against racism
- 6) Protection of human rights
- 7) Fight against hunger in the world
- 8) Fight against unemployment
- 9) Fight against crime
- None of these (SPONTANEOUS)
- Don't know”

Appendix C: Description of statistical analyses²¹

The first step of the analyses consisted of creating a separate data-file with the responses from the 8220 women who took part in the Eurobarometer 47.1 survey. From this survey, 52 questions (or variables) measuring attitudes to the European Union were selected. These variables were then subjected to a **Principal Component Analysis** in order to establish which underlying concepts best define attitudes to the European Union. The analysis showed that attitudes to the European Union are best represented by 18 concepts, which together explain 74% of the total variance.

²¹ For all the statistical analyses carried out in this study, version 7.5 of the software package ‘**Statistical Program for the Social Sciences**’ (SPSS) was used.

Typology of European women

From each of these 18 concepts, the highest loading variables were then selected for use in subsequent analyses. These are:

	% variance explained	Highest loading item	Q. N°
1.	(23.9%)	<i>Attitudes towards enlargement of the EU</i>	(Q.20)
2.	(9.1%)	<i>Level of political responsibility for matters relating to health and social welfare</i>	(Q.23e)
3.	(4.0%)	<i>Level of political responsibility for matters relating to rules for political asylum</i>	(Q.23r)
4.	(3.6%)	<i>EU should have a common defence and military policy</i>	(Q.22/3)
5.	(3.4%)	<i>Knowledge of how EU is organised</i>	(Q.8)
6.	(3.3%)	<i>Citizen of other member country has right to stand in local elections</i>	(Q.22/8)
7.	(3.3%)	<i>Level of political responsibility for matters relating to defence</i>	(Q.23a)
8.	(3.0%)	<i>EC should have support from EP</i>	(Q.22/5)
9.	(2.8%)	<i>Level of political responsibility for matters relating to supporting regions in economic trouble</i>	(Q.23l)
10.	(2.7%)	<i>Country has benefited from EU membership</i>	(Q.16)
11.	(2.0%)	<i>Pride in nationality</i>	(Q.40)
12.	(2.0%)	<i>Unification of Europe is important priority</i>	(Q.441c4)
13.	(1.9%)	<i>Committed to unification of Europe</i>	(Q.442c4)
14.	(1.9%)	<i>European identity</i>	(Q.19)
15.	(1.9%)	<i>Level of political responsibility for matters relating to the fight against drugs</i>	(Q.23t)
16.	(1.9%)	<i>Support for single European currency</i>	(Q.22/1)
17.	(1.9%)	<i>Teaching children in school about EU</i>	(Q.22/9)
18.	(1.8%)	<i>Level of political responsibility for matters relating to cultural policy</i>	(Q.23q)

The 18 variables were then recoded so that they each consisted of a mid-point of 0, a low score of -1 and a high score of +1. This is a necessary requirement for **K-Means Clustering**, the next step in the analyses. This groups people together by the similarity of their response profiles in surveys. In the case of this study, it was used to split the female population into sub-groups (or clusters) depending on their responses to the 18 variables mentioned above. The outcome of the **K-Means Clustering** procedure is that the female population of Europe consists of 5 distinct attitudinal groups, which form the basis of discussion throughout the report.

In order to describe the views of the 5 attitudinal groups, **frequencies**, **comparisons of means**, **correlation analyses** and **cross-tabulations** were run. The various variables measuring attitudes to the European Union were used as dependent variables, whereas cluster membership, country and other demographic variables were used as independent variables. For the **descriptive analyses**, a wider range of attitudinal variables were used than

the 18 selected to define the clusters. We returned to their original coding structure instead of the recoded cluster versions (See Appendix B)²².

Appendix D: Technical description of Eurobarometer N°47.1

This standard Eurobarometer public opinion survey was conducted on behalf of the **Directorate-General for Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual of the European Commission**.

Fieldwork took place between **26/3/1997 and 29/4/1997** and was done by INRA (EUROPE), a European Network of Market and Public Opinion Research agencies. Each respondent was asked an identical set of questions, using face-to-face interviewing at his or her home in the appropriate national language.

The Eurobarometer 47.1 covers the population of the 15 Member States of the European Union aged 15 years and over. The regular sample in standard Eurobarometer surveys is 1000 people per country except Luxembourg (500) and the United Kingdom (1000 in Great Britain and 300 in Northern Ireland). In order to monitor the integration of the five new Länder into unified Germany and the European Union, 2000 people are sampled in Germany since Eurobarometer 34: 1000 in East Germany and 1000 in West Germany.

In all 15 Member States, **respondents were selected using a multi-stage, random (probability) sample design.** Sampling points were drawn systematically from all “administrative regional units”, after stratification by individual unit and type of area. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn at random. Further addresses were selected as every Nth address from the initial address by standard random route procedures. In each household, the respondent was drawn at random using the first birthday rule.

The figures given for each of the Member States are weighted to match the sample to the demographic profile of the countries. The figures given for the European Union as a whole are weighted by the proportion of the adult population each country represents within the EU.

For more information about the technical aspects of this survey, please see Eurobarometer Report N°47, European Commission, Spring 1997.

²² Missing cases were excluded listwise from the Principal Component and Cluster Analyses and completely excluded from the descriptive analyses.
